Reexamining the Jewish Question

Introduction

As a matter of principle, we should always seek to ground our beliefs on a solid foundation of evidence. We should never be dogmatic, and we should always remain open to the possibility that we could be wrong. There is an old maxim: “It’s the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.”

In this paper, I argue that the conventional wisdom among WAs on the “Jewish Question” is mistaken. There is good reason to believe that many purported group differences between European Jews and gentile whites have been exaggerated. I argue that European Jews have a unique ethno-religious identity, but that they still have a white identity, and that Jews have increasingly been assimilating into white culture. I argue that if Jews are more hostile to WA interests than gentiles, this can largely be explained by group differences in religiosity, education, and perceived outgroup hostility. While I concede that Jewish elites have been disproportionately anti-white, I argue that this behavior, for the most part, is characteristic of Jewish elites rather than Jews in general. Finally, I argue that generalized hostility towards Jews is a counter-productive strategy that hurts our movement. I believe white advocacy should be a movement that accepts pro-white European Jews.

Make no mistake, we have every reason to blame anti-white Jews for the disproportionate impact they have had on immigration policy and their efforts to undermine white racial consciousness. Whites should defend themselves, and should never be afraid to confront their critics. However, it is unfair to blame an entire people for harm done by their elites. Just as blacks should not blame whites because a small number of whites owned slaves, gentile whites should not blame Jews or treat them all with hostility because of the reprehensible actions of a small Jewish elite. While we should vigorously oppose all anti-white statements and actions, I believe it is not helpful to our cause to oppose Jews as Jews.

The positions I critique do not represent the views of any particular person. Rather, I critique part of the zeitgeist of the movement. And, of course, I could be wrong. I am open to changing my mind if presented with sufficiently strong evidence. Anyone interested in having a productive discussion on the topic should feel free to contact me.

A Note on Kevin MacDonald

I agree that many influential Jews have had a negative impact on European civilization, and have done great harm to our people via the ideologies they have promoted. Nevertheless, I think there are large gaps between the activities of the Jewish public and Jewish elites. In other words, it is my contention that Jewish elites, insofar as they are anti-white, for the most part act independently of the larger Jewish population.

Some will argue that Kevin MacDonald has already refuted my thesis in his book, The Culture of Critique. I have read The Culture of Critique, and it is a fascinating book. That said, it does not refute my thesis. While Prof. MacDonald may disagree with much of what I say here, he, himself, clearly distinguishes Jewish elites from the Jewish public:

“There is no implication here [in The Culture of Critique] of a unified Jewish “conspiracy” to undermine gentile culture, as portrayed in the notorious Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Since the Enlightenment, Judaism has never been a unified, monolithic movement, and there has clearly been a great deal of disagreement among Jews as to how to protect themselves and attain their interests during this period. The movements discussed in this volume (Boasian anthropology, political radicalism, psychoanalysis, the Frankfurt School of Social Research, and the New York Intellectuals) were all advanced by relatively few individuals whose views may not have been known or understood by the majority of the Jewish community. The argument is that Jews dominated these intellectual movements, that a strong sense of Jewish identity was characteristic of the great majority of these individuals, and these individuals were pursuing a Jewish agenda in participating in these movements... There is no implication [in this book] that Judaism constitutes a unified movement or that all segments of the Jewish community participated in these movements. Jews may constitute a predominant or necessary element in radical political movements or movements in the social sciences, and Jewish identification may be compatible with or even facilitate these movements without most Jews being involved in these movements. As a result, the question of the overall effects of Jewish influence on
gentile culture is independent of the question of whether most or all Jews supported the movements to alter gentile culture.” (*The Culture of Critique*, pp. 1-2)

**Terminology**

When white advocates talk about “Jews,” they almost always mean Ashkenazi or European Jews. Although other Jewish subgroups are interesting, they are rarely relevant to most discussions of the Jewish question. Therefore, I have deliberately excluded any non-European Jews from Jewish samples, whenever this was possible or prudent. In this essay “Jew” is a synonym (or near synonym) for “European Jew.”

Also, I use “gentile” primarily to describe white Europeans who aren’t Jewish. Unless otherwise specified, “gentile” always means “white gentile.”

**I. Jewish Separatism**

One of the central assumptions of many white advocates is that Jews see themselves as a separate, non-white group. They believe Jews have no white identity and no sense of kinship with or preference for Europeans. Some even think that Jews are so highly predisposed to ethnocentrism that they can never be assimilated into gentile societies. I call this the Separatist Theory.

On its face, this theory seems reasonable. Jews have often kept their distance from gentiles. In particular, Jews have shown powerful tendencies to live near other Jews, marry other Jews, pick friends and acquaintances who are Jews, and hire Jews. Even so, there is reason to think that Jews are as capable of integrating with gentiles as other white religious groups.

**Problem 1: Fading Jewish Ethnocentrism**

In diverse societies, we would expect an alienated, ethnocentric minority group to: (1) distrust most people, (2) not expect most outsiders to be helpful, and (3) not expect fair treatment from most people. This is because most other people are not part of that minority. Jews should therefore be less trusting than gentiles, and should have lower expectations that others will help them.

The data suggest otherwise. According to the GSS, Jews were just as likely as most other white ethnic groups to agree that “most people are trustworthy,” and Jews were *more* likely than blacks, Hispanics, and Asians to agree with that statement. Similarly, Jews were as likely as most whites to agree that “most people are fair” and that “most people are helpful;” again, Jews were more likely than blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans to think so. These findings suggest that Jews do not display the kind of ethnocentrism we would expect from an alienated, ethnocentric minority group.

**Agreement that "Most People are Trustworthy" by Race/Ethnicity**

![Graph showing agreement that most people are trustworthy by race/ethnicity.](image)

**Agreement that "Most People are Helpful" by Race/Ethnicity**

![Graph showing agreement that most people are helpful by race/ethnicity.](image)
Problem 2: Jewish Intermarriage Rates and Preferences for White Spouses

Intermarriage rates are one of the best indicators of integration and assimilation. Although Jews are more likely to marry within their religion than would be expected by chance, rates of Jewish intermarriage have risen more than threefold over the last 40 years. Between 2005 and 2013, approximately 58 percent of newly married Jews married a non-Jewish spouse (vs. only 17 percent before the 1970s). [8] From the 1950s to 2013, the proportion of Jews in new marriages who married non-Jews increased at a linear rate of about 7.5 percentage points every decade. If current Jewish intermarriage trends continue—and they show no sign of stopping—by the year 2044 (the year the US Census predicts that whites will become a minority), roughly 84 percent of American Jews who marry in that year will marry a spouse who isn’t Jewish. Incidentally, the annual increase in the share of people who marry outside their religion has been far greater for American Jews than it has been for Christians. [9]

The exception to this trend is Orthodox Jews, who rarely marry out. In several generations many remaining Jews could be Orthodox, neither marrying out nor assimilating. However, their effect on the larger society is minimal—like that of the Amish. Furthermore, unlike secular Jews, Orthodox Jews are more likely than white Mainline Protestants, Catholics, or Orthodox Christians to identify with the Republican party. [10] Recent statistics also suggest a degree of instability to Orthodox Jewish identity. According to the Pew Research Center, less than half of those who were raised in an Orthodox Jewish tradition still adhere to their religious upbringing as adults. [11]

According to recent data, married Jews were just as likely as married gentiles to have a white spouse; in both cases the figure was approximately 94 percent. [12] When I combined Pew survey data with Reuters/Ipsos data, I calculated that 12-16 percent of Jews in Jewish-gentile marriages have non-white spouses. While this is more than twice the out-marriage rate of whites as a whole, it still means that Jews who marry out have a clear preference for whites (given that the US is about 39 percent non-white). Put another way, Jews who marry outside of their religion are roughly three times less likely to marry a non-white person than would be expected by chance.
In sum, Jews increasingly marry outside their religion, and when they do, they prefer to marry whites rather than non-whites. This is not consistent with the Separatism Hypothesis.

**Problem 3: Jewish Dating Preferences**

According to the dating website CoffeeMeetsBagle, white gentiles and Jews have very similar dating preferences. Jews of both sexes were more likely than white gentiles to prefer dating whites, despite the fact that the website lets users state a preference for any racial group. What’s more, Jews of both sexes were more likely than gentiles to express an exclusive preference for white people. This is not what one would expect if Jews had no white identity.

**Problem 4: Jewish Attitudes towards the Marital Choices of Relatives**

One test of the Separatist Hypothesis is how Jews feel about the choices their relatives make in marriage partners. According to data from the General Social Survey collected between 2000 and 2014, Jews were slightly more likely than gentiles to prefer that relatives marry white people. Approximately one out of every 50 gentiles said they would oppose relatives marrying white people; the GSS did not turn up a single Jew who felt that way.

**Problem 5: Jewish Endogamy Rates Compared to Other Religious Groups**

Proponents of the Separatist Theory assume that Jews are uniquely ethnocentric and that this reflects something inherent in Jews. They argue further that Jewish ethnocentrism is so ingrained that it is an insurmountable barrier to successfully integrating Jews into gentile societies.

However, Jews appear less ethnocentric than several other groups. Using data from the Pew Research Center, I found that Hindus, Orthodox Christians, Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Buddhists, and Mormons are all far more likely than Jews to be endogamous, or marry within their religion. With the possible exception of Muslims and Hindus, these groups are rarely accused of ethnocentrism.
Of the 12 religious groups, Jews rank only 7th most likely to marry within their religion. Furthermore, Jews actually marry gentiles at higher rates than one would expect given the general relationship between the size of a religion, and the rate of co-religionist marriages. \[16\]

The following graph shows that Jews are slightly less overrepresented in endogamous marriages as the regression line predicts they should be, given their population size. Actual Jewish overrepresentation is 28 fold, whereas their predicted overrepresentation is 34.7 fold. This is evidence that Jews lack an exceptionally ethnocentric preference to marry in.

**Problem 6: Jewish Religious Retention Rates**

One measure of Jewish ethnocentrism is whether people raised Jewish are more likely than people of other faiths to retain their childhood religion.

Of 22 religious groups, Jews rank only 12th most likely to do so. Anabaptists, Baptists, Hindus, Lutherans, Methodists, Mormons, Muslims, Pentecostalists, and several other groups, all have a greater tendency to maintain their childhood religion as adults. Jews are only one percentage point more likely than Catholics to retain the religion in which they were reared. \[17\][18]

**Problem 7: The White Identity of Jews**

The view that Jews lack any sense of white identity is not without some support. The Israeli press has published articles by Jews who openly proclaim that Jews are not white. \[19\] While such statements are striking, they are not a reliable guide to the sentiments of most Jews.

The most straightforward way to test whether Jews have a white identity is to see how they identify themselves when presented with a wide choice of racial categories. According to the Pew Research Center, 90-95 percent of American Jews identify as Non-Hispanic Whites (Note: “Net Jewish” means “All Jews”). \[20\]

![Graph showing religious group overrepresentation in endogamous marriages.](image)

**Race and Ethnicity of U.S. Jews**

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<th>NET Jewish by religion</th>
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Skeptics might argue that these results reflect an inadequate number of racial categories. Jews may call themselves “white” only because this designation is closer to their true racial identity than black or Hispanic. However, in recent years, large surveys of
Jews conducted by Pew have included a “mixed” or “Non-Hispanic-Other” category as an option. If Jews had no white identity, we would expect many to identify as “Non-Hispanic-Other” rather than “Non-Hispanic-White.” For example, if a white man were answering a survey that offered only the options of “black,” “Hispanic,” “Asian,” or “Other,” he would choose “Other.” Hence, the most plausible explanation for why nearly all Jews identify as “non-Hispanic-White,” is that they think of themselves as white, just as gentiles do.

Problem 8: Kinship Between Whites and Jews

Some Jews have openly called for the demographic replacement of whites. One example is Barbara Spectre, an American-born Jew, and the founder of Paideia, a Swedish-government-funded European Institute for Jewish Studies. In an interview for an IBA News Report, she once said:

“I think there is a resurgence of anti-Semitism because at this point in time Europe has not yet learned how to be multicultural. And I think we are going to be part of the throes of that transformation, which must take place. European societies are not going to be the monolithic societies they once were in the last century. Jews are going to be at the center of that. It’s a huge transformation for Europe to make. They are now going into a multicultural mode and Jews will be resented because of our leading role. But without that leading role and without that transformation, Europe will not survive.”[21]

Noel Ignatiev is another Jew who has had a career as an anti-white propagandist. This former Harvard history instructor has said: “Keep bashing the dead white males, and the live ones, and the females, too, until the social construct known as the white race is destroyed. Not deconstructed, but destroyed.”[22]

He has said further that “there can be no White race without the phenomenon of White supremacy,” and that “Whiteness is an identity that arises entirely out of oppression.”[23]

Writing for the prominent Israeli newspaper Haaretz, the Jewish writer Yigal Ben-Nun wrote:

Arab migration has been the best thing that’s happened to Europe in the past 50 years. Arabs in Europe are a fact of life. It’s time we started to accept that there’s no way to block the migration of Chinese, Pakistanis or Arabs to Europe. . . . It’s true, Europe won’t be what it once was, but that’s a good thing. . . . [The] more migrants from Africa and Asia who arrive, the better off Europe will be. Sooner or later, their children and grandchildren will marry into veteran European families and change the demographics of their countries. Europe will be different.[24]

The chairman and publisher of the New York Times Arthur Sulzberger Jr. explained the consequences of his attempts to make the Times more diverse: “If white men were not complaining, it would be an indication we weren’t succeeding and making the inroads that we are.”[25]

Harris Sussman is a diversity consultant, and the former writer of Managing Diversity, the most popular national publication on workforce diversity in the United States. So high profile was Dr. Sussman’s work, that several Federal Agencies subscribed to his publication. Dr. Sussman wrote:

In our post-modern vocabulary, `whites' or `the white man' is all we need to say to invoke this history and experience of injustice and cruelty. When we say `white people,' we mean the people of greed who value things over people, who value money over people. We know exactly what their values are and where they lead. We have all paid a terrible price for those values. [26]

The renowned writer, filmmaker, and social critic Susan Sontag once wrote: “The white race is the cancer of human history; it is the white race alone—its ideologies and inventions—which eradicates autonomous civilizations wherever it spreads, which has upset the ecological balance of the planet, and which now threatens the existence of life itself.”[27]

Gentiles rarely write in such harsh terms. It is therefore easy to believe that Jews have no sense of kinship towards whites, and are hostile towards them. However, survey data suggest that most Jews do not share these sentiments.

How should one gauge the emotional closeness Jews feel towards whites? The General Social Survey asked Jews and gentiles whether they felt “very close” to whites, “not at all close” to whites, or “neither one nor the other.”
By aggregating GSS data from 1996 to 2014, I obtained sample sizes large enough to compare Jews to gentiles. According to the GSS, a majority of Jews say they feel “very close” to white people, and there were no group differences in the responses of Jews and gentiles.\[28\][29][30]

When Jews and gentiles were asked if they feel emotionally close to blacks, supermajorities of both groups say they had no feelings one way or the other. Jews were slightly more likely than gentiles to say they had no feeling towards blacks one way or the other, and there was little difference in the share of gentiles and Jews who felt “very close” or “not at all close” to blacks. All in all, Jews were four to five times more likely to say they felt “very close” to whites than they were to have similar feelings towards blacks.

Finally, using data from Dr. Tom Smith’s analysis of the GSS on 29 questions examining behavior, social attitudes, and political attitudes of Jews and other European groups, I found (with one exception) that Jewish attitudes were more similar to those of every other white ethnic group than they were to those of any non-white group. The only exception was Germans, with Jewish attitudes slightly more similar to those of Asians than those of Germans. Unsurprisingly, Eastern Europeans were the group whose views were most similar to European Jews.\[31\]

The answers of Jews to some of the 29 questions do suggest departures from the consensus views of whites. For example, among all white ethnic groups, Jews were more likely than several white subgroups to support the use of busing to integrate schools—though support was still limited to less than a third of all Jews.

When asked if black-white differences were the result of less black education, Jews were more likely than every other ethnic group to agree—even more than blacks themselves.
Jews were also the most likely group (apart from Blacks and Hispanics) to say that “too little is spent on assistance to blacks.”

There are many other Jew/Gentile comparisons in Dr. Tom Smith’s GSS report. Some readers may conclude that there are a number that reflect badly on Jews. For example, they are more likely than other groups to be tolerant of homosexuality, premarital sex, pornography, and adultery. However, when it comes to many attitudes on race, Jews as a group are not significantly out of step with gentiles.

Problem 9: Jewish Tolerance of “Racists”

Some white advocates imagine the typical Jew as someone like a Marxist sociology professor—someone who actively opposes any person who contradicts his anti-white narrative.

However, combining several years of GSS data shows that Jews are equally (or more) likely than most white ethnic groups—and more likely than most non-white groups—to think “racists” should be allowed to make public speeches, to oppose firing teachers for “racist” attitudes, and to think “racist” publications should be allowed in public libraries. Jews, therefore, appear to be some of the strongest defenders of individual expression, even of views they may find distasteful.
Problem 10: Jewish Childrearing Suggests Assimilation

Jews increasingly view themselves as “Jewish” in purely cultural rather than religious terms. This is a very significant shift. American Jews born in the 1980s were nearly five times more likely than Jews born in the 1920s to identify as “culturally Jewish.”

The assumption that Jews are inherently predisposed to exceptional ethnocentrism would lead one to expect nearly all Jews to rear their children to be religiously or at least culturally Jewish. After all, the primary way minority groups preserve their identities is by passing on their culture, customs, and religious beliefs to their children.

However, around one-fifth of all Jewish households with children have deliberately chosen to bring their children up without any Jewish identity. No fewer than 67 percent of families that are culturally Jewish say they are not rearing their children to be religiously or culturally Jewish. Religious Jews, on the other hand, show stronger signs of ethnocentrism, and the vast majority still rear children to be Jewish. [33]

It is a sign of assimilation that an increasing share of Jews are rearing children to be non-Jewish. The increasing share of “cultural Jews” in the Jewish population is also consistent with assimilation, as is the fact that a super-majority of culturally Jewish households with children are rearing their children without a Jewish identity at all.
Concluding Remarks on the Separatism Hypothesis

Some white advocates argue that Jews lack the white identity and emotional closeness to gentiles required to support European civilization. They argue that Jewish ethnocentrism and zero-sum-game competition with whites are so strong and constant that Jews have no place in white societies.

The evidence suggests that while Jews may be moderately ethnocentric, they are not uniquely so compared to other white ethnics. Jews are increasingly integrating with whites, and appear to have a white identity. Rather than a separatist mentality, Jews appear to have a sense of loyalty, kinship, and emotional feeling towards whites that is similar to the way whites feel about each other.

II. The Jewish Fifth Column

Many white advocates subscribe to something I call the Fifth Column Hypothesis (FCH). Historically, the idea of a fifth column refers to a dedicated minority group that undermines a nation from within to support an external enemy. This is how many in our movement conceive of Jewish activities in western countries. The hypothesis can be defined as follows: Jews in European countries are always more liberal than whites, and will remain so. Jewish liberalism is part of a cohesive group strategy that Jews use to indoctrinate white gentiles with ideologies designed to advance the ethnic interests of Jews at the expense of gentiles. By contrast, Jews in Israel adopt nationalist policies that are anything but liberal.

Problem 1: International Variation in Jewish Voting Patterns and Political Ideologies

If the Fifth Column Hypothesis were true, there should be no white nation with a large Jewish population in which Jews were less liberal (or no more liberal) than gentiles. FCH assumes that a majority of European Jews in almost every white country are helping to subvert European ethnic nationalism. Yet it makes little sense to call something a Jewish “group strategy” if it is not followed by large Jewish majorities in several different countries.

If large Jewish majorities actively promoted anti-white views, and if Jews could not be dissuaded from acting on these views, then there might be reason to believe in the FCH. Whites would also have grounds to think Jews should be kept out of white countries. It seems to me that such questions can be settled only by comparing the political ideologies of Jews and gentiles in white countries.

I would note that there is some risk in comparing Jewish patterns of voting in different countries. It is not always easy to place foreign parties along a continuum that accurately indicates relative levels of support for WA-related positions. At the same time, Jews may have reasons other than WA sympathies to vote for parties that may be only marginally more favorable to the interest of whites. Still, I believe international comparisons are worthwhile, and the results do not generally support the Fifth Column Hypothesis. [34]

According to a 2011 Ipsos and Reid Poll, a majority of Jews in Canada voted for the Conservative Party in the 2008 and 2011 federal elections, and it also found that Canadian Jews were more likely than gentiles to vote Conservative. [35] [36] [37] In addition, in 2008, the general white public was three times more likely than Canadian Jews to vote for the far-left New Democratic Party. In 2011, whites were twice as likely to vote for the NDP. It is true that Jews were a bit more likely than gentiles to support Canada’s center-left Liberal Party. Still, among Canada’s ethnic and religious groups, Jews tied with Protestants as the Canadian group most likely to vote for a right-wing party in 2008 and 2011.

![2011 Canadian Federal Election Voter Preferences](image-url)
What is more, Canadian Jews were no more likely than gentiles to report having a left-wing ideology. Surprisingly, Jews were more likely than gentiles to identify with the political right. They were also equally likely to identify as moderate. The evidence suggests that, contrary to what some may think, gentiles in Canada are more leftist than Jews. [38]

It is not only in Canada that Jews identify with the right. During the 2010 British Elections, Jews were nearly twice as likely as gentiles to vote Conservative, they were less likely to vote for Labour, and were equally likely to support the Liberal Democrats. On the whole, Jews were more likely than any other ethnic group in Britain to vote for a right-wing party in 2010. [39] [40]

Moreover, the 2015 General Election provides clear evidence that British Jews support the right. [41] [42] [43]

In 2015, nearly 70 percent of Jews voted for the Conservatives (compared to 40 percent of British gentiles). Jews in Britain were also less likely to vote for Labor, and were four times less likely to vote for the Liberal Democrats.

British Jews were less enthusiastic about voting for UKIP. [44] Still, they were more likely than any other ethnic group in Britain to vote for a right-wing party in the last two general elections. British Jews appear to offer some of the strongest resistance to the left, and are some of the staunchest supporters of the right.

Furthermore, Jews in Britain have become more right wing over time. In the 1990s, Jews split their votes between Labour and Conservatives much as other Britons did. Overwhelming Jewish support for the right in the last two elections suggests that Jews in Britain have become less liberal and more right wing.

Jewish politics in other English-speaking countries also fit the British pattern. According to Kenneth Wald, a professor of political science at the University of Florida, “From the late 1970s on, Australian Jews developed and exhibited a strong preference for the country’s conservative party, the Liberals, giving the party’s candidates roughly three-fifths of their support in most elections.” [45] The somewhat misnamed Australian Liberal Party has historically offered more resistance to mass immigration than any other mainstream Australian party. If Jews in the West were uniformly bent on promoting open borders, we would expect Australian Jews to favor the Labor party and its support for open borders.

Data on French Jews suggests that they, too, are attracted to right-wing politics. Unfortunately, French polling data rarely includes racial breakdowns of
respondents. Moreover, French law prohibits collecting census data on racial and religious groups. Therefore, we have no way directly to compare the responses of French Jews to those of gentiles. Nevertheless, according to independent estimates, France is approximately 78-87 percent white.\textsuperscript{[46]} \textsuperscript{[47]} Since non-whites tend to vote less often than whites, it is reasonable to think that surveys of likely voters comparing Jews to the general French public are probably de-facto comparisons of Jews to gentile whites.

Bearing in mind these limitations, a majority of French Jews (59 percent) voted for a right-wing candidate in the first round of France’s 2012 Presidential Elections. \textsuperscript{[48]} \textsuperscript{[49]} \textsuperscript{[50]} In particular, 40 to 45 percent of Jews supported the rightist “Union for a Popular Movement” (compared to only 26 percent of the general population). Among the mainstream French parties, the UMP has one of the tougher stances on immigration.

Finally, a variety of independent studies of Jews in European countries conducted between the late 1970s and late 2000s have found that Jews in white countries haven’t been significantly more leftist than gentiles, and that European Jews tend to fall to the right or center of the political spectrum. \textsuperscript{[52]} This, contrary to the stereotype of Jews being liberal everywhere outside of Israel, Jewish liberalism appears to be more the exception than the rule.

**Problem 2: Rising Jewish Support for Right-Wing Parties**

Further assumptions of the Fifth Column theory are that: (1) the vast majority of Jews in white countries will remain liberal, and (2) the proportion of Jews in these countries who are liberal will either increase or remain stable.

The best evidence for static Jewish liberalism comes from the United States. During every US presidential election from 1916 to 2012, Jews have been more likely than the general white population to vote for a leftist candidate. \textsuperscript{[53]} \textsuperscript{[54]} \textsuperscript{[55]} Moreover, over the last century, Jewish voters have supported leftist candidates about as much as they always have, whereas gentile voters have gradually abandoned the left. \textsuperscript{[56]}

![PERCENTAGE OF FRENCH JEWISH VOTERS WHO VOTED FOR THE NATIONAL FRONT](source: IFOP Polls (2002-2012))

![FRENCH CITIZEN SUPPORT FOR THE UNION FOR A POPULAR MOVEMENT (UMP)](source: IFOP Polls (2012))

That said, French Jews were somewhat less supportive of the National Front. About 18 percent of the French public voted for the Front, whereas only 14 percent of Jews did so. Nevertheless, there are signs of change. For years, the National Front and its founder Jean-Marie Le Pen have been widely perceived as having a history of anti-Semitism. Despite this, Jewish support for the NF has almost tripled since 2002, and shows no signs of slowing. \textsuperscript{[51]}
On the other hand, there is a possible weakness in these data. While Jewish voter participation is above average, in any given year, a substantial minority of eligible Jews—typically 20–40 percent—do not vote. An even larger percentage of gentiles do not vote. Yet correcting for selection bias by way of representative surveys doesn’t produce estimates that differ substantially from exit polls. On the whole, America’s Jews were about twice as likely to identify with the Democratic Party (61 percent) as they were to identify with the Republican Party (29 percent).

By contrast, gentiles favored Republicans (50 percent) over the Democrats (41 percent). In addition, around 60 percent of Jews identified as liberal (compared to 40 percent of gentiles), whereas 40 percent of Jews had a conservative affiliation (compared to 60 percent of gentiles). Since the US has more Jews than any other white country, this evidence appears consistent with the Fifth Column theory.

Is there evidence to the contrary? In recent decades, American Jews have increasingly identified with the Republican Party. According to several Gallup polls conducted between 2008 and 2014, Jewish identification with the Democratic Party declined from 71 percent in 2008 to 61 percent in 2014. By contrast, Jewish support for the Republican Party increased seven points from 22 percent to 29 percent.

Skeptics might attribute this change to Barrack Obama’s disagreements with Israel. However, the Jewish trend rightward precedes President Obama’s presidency by at least a decade. According to data from the American Jewish Committee, the proportion of Jewish Republicans roughly doubled between 2000 and 2012. Other data suggest that in 2000, around 18–20 percent of Jews said they were (or leaned) Republican. That number rose to 24 percent in 2007 (before the Obama presidency), and in 2014 it stood at 31 percent. Moreover, if we plot the results of two decades’ worth of surveys, we see a distinctly upward trend in the proportion of Jews who identify as Republican (one that is also significant). Therefore, Jewish liberalism, even in the United States, does not appear to be fixed.

Some Jews may be attracted to the Republican Party because of its support for Israel and its willingness to wage wars on Muslim countries. Nevertheless, there need be no conflict between affection for Israel and the goals of white advocacy. As I shall discuss later, the immigration and foreign policy attitudes of Jewish Republicans are nearly indistinguishable from those of their gentile counterparts.

To summarize, Jews in Britain have been moving to the right since at least 1995. Jewish support for the Conservatives grew from 45 percent in 1995 to 59 percent in 2010, to nearly 70 percent in 2015. In France, Jewish support for the National Front has more than tripled since 2002. Also, according to Professor Kenneth Wald’s analysis of Jewish involvement in Canadian politics, “During the period from 1953-1983, Canadian Jews did tend to prefer center or center-left parties but, unlike their American coreligionists, were not very different from other religious groups in the country’s electorate.” This suggests that Canadian Jews have also shifted to the right since the 1980s, given that Jewish majorities supported the Conservatives in both the 2008 and 2011 federal elections. Also, as noted earlier, approximately three-fifths of Australian Jews have consistently voted conservative since the 1970s.
Contrary to what the Fifth Column theory would predict, Jewish liberalism is neither monolithic nor constant, and Jews across the globe have become increasingly right leaning over time. Contrary to the assumptions of many white advocates, a reduction in the Jewish population of Europe, Canada, and Australia would entail an immediate shift to the left.

**Problem 3: Lack of Jewish Confidence in “Jewish” Institutions**

In Western societies, three institutions disseminate prevailing ideologies: movies, the media, and universities. It is also true that Jews are vastly overrepresented in elite media and university positions. As Prof. MacDonald notes, “In a survey performed in the 1980’s, 60 percent of a representative sample of [American] movie elite were of Jewish backgrounds” (Culture of Critique, lvi). Citing work from Lichter et al. (1983) and others, Prof. MacDonald notes that “…Jews constitute approximately 2.5 percent of the US population. [Thus] If the Jewish percentage of the American media elite is estimated at 59 percent—probably an underestimate at the present time—the degree of disproportionate representation may be calculated as greater than 2000 percent. The likelihood that such an extraordinary disparity could arise by chance is virtually nil.”

Prof. MacDonald also notes that at the time the Culture of Critique was published, many of the largest media corporations in the United States were either owned or controlled by Jews. These included: AOL-Time Warner, Home Box Office, CNN, Turner Broadcasting, Warner Music, Warner Brothers Studios, New Line Cinema, Time, Sports, and People Magazine, Fortune Magazine, Walt Disney, Touchstone, Hollywood Pictures, Caravan Pictures, Miramax Films, ABC, ESPN, Lifetime, A&E, Viacom, CBS, MTV, VH-1, Nickelodeon, Showtime, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and others. Furthermore, Jewish ownership and even domination of American media institutions is no great secret among Jews. As Ben Stein has said: “Do the Jews run Hollywood? You bet they do—and what of it?” (The Culture of Critique; lvi).

However, even if the evidence shows that a small number of Jewish elites dominate our media, and even if there is reason to think that these elites have promoted anti-white views, these facts alone do not justify belief in the Fifth Column Theory. This is because although Jewish media elites may promote these toxic ideologies, it could also be true that Jewish elites act independently of the Jewish public.

If there were a Jewish Fifth Column that extended all the way to the public, we would predict that Jews should be more likely than any other racial group to express high levels of confidence in higher education, television, and the press. There is no question that American television, media, and universities have promoted anti-white ideologies. If Jews disproportionately support those ideologies, they should have greater faith than gentiles in these institutions. Moreover, Jews have been highly overrepresented among college admissions officers and university faculty for many years. As a result, the Fifth Column Theory predicts that Jews should have more confidence than gentiles in higher education. GSS data show this is not the case.

Dr. Tom Smith’s analysis of the General Social Survey found that between 1990 and 2002, Jews were no more or less likely than any other European ethnic group to have confidence in television, the media, and higher education. Jews were also less likely than Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians to express confidence in television and higher education, and were less likely than Hispanics and Asians to express confidence in the mass media.

I re-aggregated GSS data in order to compare gentiles to European Jews in two separate time periods, 1973 – 1989 and 1990 – 2014. During the 1970s and 80s, I found that Jews were just as likely as gentiles to have confidence in the media, but were slightly less likely to say they had “hardly any” confidence. On the other hand, after 1989, Jews were just as likely as gentiles to express large, moderate, and low levels of confidence in the American media.
CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESS

[Source: General Social Survey (1973-2014)]
[Error Bars Represent 95% Confidence Intervals]

- White Gentiles (1990-2014)
- European Jews (1990-2014)

For education, Jews expressed slightly less confidence from 1973 to 1989, but after 1990, had no more confidence in education than gentiles.\(^69\)

CONFIDENCE IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION

[Source: General Social Survey (1973-2014)]
[Error Bars Represent 95% Confidence Intervals]

- White Gentiles (1990-2014)
- European Jews (1990-2014)

Dr. Smith’s analysis tells a similar story. From 1991 to 2002, he found that Jews were no more likely than any other white ethnic group to express confidence in education. He also found that all white ethnic groups (and Jews) were less likely than Hispanics, Asians, and blacks to express confidence in higher education. Dr. Smith found the same results for television. Hispanics, Asians, and blacks express more confidence in television than any white group, and Jews express no more confidence in it than other Euro-American subgroup.\(^70\)

In conclusion, there is little support for the Fifth Column theory. There is a great deal of international variation in Jewish voting patterns and political ideologies. Jews in the West are becoming less liberal, and Jews have no more trust than gentiles in Jewish-dominated institutions. These results suggest that the anti-white behavior of certain Jewish elites does not reflect the views of ordinary Jews.\(^71\)

III. Jews and the Gates of Europe

Perhaps the strongest evidence against Jews involves the systematic efforts by Jewish elites to promote mass immigration into white countries. The Culture of Critique outlines these efforts in striking detail, and they may lead one to conclude that: (1) the Jewish public overwhelmingly supports open borders and massive Third-World immigration, (2) that far more than any other group, Jews want to open the West’s immigration floodgates, and (3) that Jews in general are responsible for opening the West to non-white immigration. I call this the Floodgate Theory. Here are four reasons why the theory is probably false.

Reason 1: The Floodgate Theory Can’t Explain Jewish Attitudes on Immigration

Using 11 different surveys from Ipsos and Reuters, I examined the percentage point differences between Jews and the general white population on a total of 34 questions related to immigration policy (110 comparisons in all). The questions involved things such as: deporting illegal aliens, increasing or decreasing legal immigration, the appropriate numbers of border patrol agents, E-Verify, construction of a border wall, amnesty, allowing Syrian refugees into the United States and Europe, the effect of immigration on society, etc.

Percentage of Reuters Immigration Question Proportions with Statistically Significant Jew-Gentile Differences

[Method: 95% Credibility Intervals; Two-Tailed Tests]

On 65 percent of the questions, there were no statistically significant differences between Jews and gentiles. Only on 35 percent of the question items did any Jew/Gentile differences reach significance.
On 6 percent of the items in which there was a difference, the difference was in the opposite direction of what the Floodgate Theory predicted. For example, while 72 percent of gentiles disagreed with the view that “the government should only have minimal authority over immigration into the United States,” 87 percent of Jews disagreed. Likewise, 37 percent of gentiles disagreed with the view that “it’s Europe’s responsibility to take in a majority of refugees,” while nearly half of Jews disagreed.

The following graphs represent some of the most striking examples of Jew and gentile similarity in attitudes on immigration. They contradict the Floodgate Theory.
There were some important questions on which the Jewish response did support the Floodgate Theory, and the following are some of the most striking. Forty-five percent of white gentiles “agree with Donald Trump on immigration” whereas only 30 percent of Jews do. Fifty-two percent of Jews support “a pathway to citizenship for illegal immigrants,” whereas only 39 percent of gentiles do. Likewise, 57 percent of Jews say that “all countries should open their borders to refugees,” while only 39 percent of gentiles do. Moreover, Jews were slightly less likely than gentiles to favor the construction of a wall along the US-Mexico border.

All in all, approximately 67 percent of the immigration responses opposed the Floodgate Theory, 17 percent supported it weakly, and only 15 percent clearly supported it.

The vote in Britain to leave the European Union (“Brexit”) was another test of the Floodgate Theory. A vote to leave was widely interpreted as a vote against not just mass immigration and multiculturalism but against other typically leftist causes such as feminism, globalization, and the green movement. The Floodgate Theory therefore predicts that British Jews would be more likely than British gentiles to oppose Brexit. In fact, British Jews were just as likely as British whites to vote for Brexit.
In the United States, however, there is no denying that Jews display a tendency towards liberalism on immigration. Yet how large a group difference must be in order to be thought of as “substantial” is a subjective question. If whites and Jews are as likely to share the same attitudes on nearly 70 percent of immigration-related issues, it does not seem fair to single out ordinary Jews for their role in supposedly opening the floodgates.

I’ve included the full immigration dataset as well as other important details on Reuters/Ipsos surveys in the following endnotes.

Reason 2: Jews Aren’t Uniquely Partisan on Immigration and Foreign Policy

The Floodgate Hypothesis has two main corollaries. One is that Jewish Democrats should be far more leftist than gentile Democrats on immigration. The other is that Jewish Republicans should be fake, Jeb-Bush-style conservatives, who are unusually hawkish on foreign policy, favor a tax break here and there, but are otherwise leftists who want open borders. In fact, polling data suggest that there are no systematic differences on immigration between Jewish and gentile Democrats and between Jewish and gentile Republicans.

In order to evaluate these corollaries, I compared the views of Jewish and gentile Democrats across 19 immigration-related questions in which the sample sizes were large enough to compare the groups. On 95 percent of the immigration items, there were no differences. The same pattern was also found with Republicans. On 86 percent of the immigration responses, there were no differences between gentile and Jewish Republicans.

Furthermore, if we represent group differences in immigration attitudes across all items in the form of averages, overall differences border on irrelevance. There was no mean difference between gentile and Jewish Democrats ($\bar{x} = 0$ percent, $SD = 4.8$ percent), and there were also no mean differences between white and Jewish Republicans ($\bar{x} = 0$ percent, $SD = 3.6$ percent). Thus, any differences between Jews and gentiles in the same party appear to be insignificant.

Donald Trump provides another test of whether Jewish and gentile Republicans see eye to eye on immigration. If the Partisan Theory is correct, we would expect Jewish Republicans to be much less supportive of Mr. Trump than gentile Republicans. Yet aggregating a year’s worth of matchup polls suggests that both groups are equally likely to support him. [73]

Democratic Jews show a different pattern: they are less willing to vote for Mr. Trump, more willing to vote for Mrs. Clinton, and more likely to vote. [76]
On foreign policy, Jewish Republicans have views analogous to their gentile counterparts and generally agree on how to pursue US interests abroad. Jewish Republicans do not appear to be markedly pro-war, and their views on appropriate levels of military spending are identical to those of gentile Republicans.

Within the general population, however, gentiles and Jews were equally likely to favor, oppose, or to have a neutral attitude towards military action to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. I also examined 50 responses to 17 foreign policy questions that compared Jews and gentiles in general. Overall, there were no average differences between Jews and Gentiles ($\overline{x} = 0$, $SD = 7.6\%$, $p > 0.99$). On 68 percent of the responses, there were no statistically significant differences. For example, both groups were equally likely to support (or oppose) the use of US military action to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

I examined five foreign policy questions (with 19 possible responses) for differences between Jewish and gentile Republicans. 84 percent of the responses contradicted by Partisan theory by exhibiting no statistically significant differences between Jewish and gentile Republicans. 5 percent of the responses provided weak support for the Partisan theory and only 11 percent exhibited differences of notable size. There were also no mean differences in the foreign policy responses of Jews and Gentiles within the GOP ($\overline{x} = 0$ percent, $SD = 5.3$ percent, $p > 0.99$).

I also examined 50 responses to 17 foreign policy questions that compared Jews and gentiles in general. Overall, there were no average differences between Jews and Gentiles ($\overline{x} = 0$, $SD = 7.6\%$, $p > 0.99$). On 68 percent of the responses, there were no statistically significant differences. For example, both groups were equally likely to support (or oppose) the use of US military action to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
military force as a means to promote the American policy objectives.

Furthermore, on those foreign policy responses in which there was a difference, 31 percent weakly supported the Partisan Hypothesis, 31 percent supported it, but 38 percent opposed it. A primary example of the latter is the fact that Jews expressed higher levels of support for reducing the size of the US military. Readers can find a link to the full set of comparisons at the following endnote. [77]

In sum, while there appear to be a few Jewish Republicans who support a hawkish US foreign policy out of a desire to help Israel, Jews in the GOP largely see eye to eye with gentiles.

Reason 3: No Correlation Between Mass Immigration and the Size of the Jewish Population

If the Jewish public were responsible for opening the immigration floodgates, we would expect countries with more Jews to have larger shares of immigrants. If we look at data on 39 white countries in which there was information on the size of the country’s immigrant and Jewish populations, we see a positive (but statistically insignificant) correlation between the number of Jews per 100,000 people, and immigrants as a percentage of the population (r = 0.23, p > 0.16). [78] [79]

![Jewish Population & Immigrant Share of the Population](image)

At first glance, this statistical insignificance appears to falsify the Floodgate Theory. How could Jews be causing massive Third-World immigration into white countries when European countries with a strong Jewish presence are no more likely than countries with a weak presence to have large immigrant populations?

On the other hand, due to technical issues involving significance testing on small numbers of countries, the question is more complicated. Although data at the national level represent thousands of observations, the statistics used to evaluate correlations between countries treat each country as if it were a single individual. This, coupled with the use of stringent criteria for statistical significance (e.g. α = 0.05) increases the likelihood of false negatives. In other words, because of the problematic assumptions behind the statistics used to evaluate relationships between countries, there is reason to think that a failure to find a significant correlation between Jews and immigrants could be a false negative. Put another way, there may be a weak (but real) tendency for a country’s immigrant population to increase as the size of its Jewish population increases.

In addition, one of the countries in the sample, Luxembourg, is a major outlier (it is 3.9 standard deviations away from the regression line). [80] Aside from being an outlier, there are other reasons to exclude Luxembourg from the sample. It is a very small, cosmopolitan country, it has an unusually high per capita income, it has a large immigrant population, and most of its immigrants are from Europe. If we exclude Luxembourg from our sample, then a weak positive correlation does emerge between Jews and immigrants as a share of a white country’s population (r = 0.32, p <0.05).

Advocates of the Floodgate Theory might argue that this vindicates the theory, but this is not necessarily so. Even if there is a real correlation between Jews and immigrants, this might not be because Jews are “opening the floodgates,” but because: (a) immigrants prefer relocating to wealthier countries, and (b) European Jews also prefer living in wealthy countries.

To rule out the possibility that associations between Jews and immigrants might exist for no other reason than their shared preference rich countries, I controlled for per capita income at the national level. [81] The result suggests that the share of Jews within a nation cannot explain any of the variation in immigrants as a share of a European country’s population when national wealth is held constant (p > 0.70, β = 0.05). Accounting for national wealth also eliminated the Jew-Immigrant correlation for the years 1990, 2000, and 2010.

In layman’s terms, so long as white countries are equally wealthy, they are just as likely to have high or low levels of immigrants (on average), no matter how
many Jews live in them. Prosperity rather than Jewish influence appears to be the main reason why the Third World immigrates to Europe. \[82\]

Furthermore, there was no correlation between the number of Jews per 100,000 people within a white nation, and percentage changes in the number of immigrants (as a percentage of a country’s population) between 1990 and 2013. Put simply, white countries with large Jewish populations are no more or less likely to gain more immigrants over time compared to countries with small Jewish populations. By the same token, there was no association between increases or decreases in a white country’s Jewish population, and changes in its immigrant population. \[83\]

Also, in examining 34 countries in which the population answered questions about immigration, and in which the size of the country’s Jewish population was available, agreement with the statement “we should further restrict and control immigration” was insignificantly correlated with the number of Jews per 100,000. \[84\] Furthermore, if we exclude all non-European countries from this sample (n = 14), the correlation between restrictionist sentiment and the relative size of the Jewish population was positive though insignificant (r = 0.15, p > 0.62). \[85\]

Within the United States, there was no relationship between changes in a state’s Jewish population, and changes in the size of its “foreign-born” population between 1950 and 2010. \[86\]

Skeptics may retort that this result is irrelevant to discussions of the Jewish question, as immigration policy is controlled entirely at the national level. According to this line of thought, failure to find a long term correlation between changes in the Jewish and immigrant populations does not stem from a lack of trying on the part of the Jewish public. On the contrary, it is merely an indication that state governments lack
the policy tools required to affect immigration to their state.

While such replies sound entirely plausible, they are also inconsistent with the empirical evidence. This is because state’s with pro-alien policies also tend to have more immigrants (and vice versa).

To measure the degree to which a state’s policies promoted immigration, I constructed a pro-alien policy index. This index included categorical measures such as whether a state is a sanctuary state, and/or provides drivers licenses, in-state tuition, and financial aid to illegal aliens. It also included continuous measures such as the number of sanctuary cities per 1000 cities, sanctuary counties per 1000 counties, as well as state spending per capita on education and welfare benefits for illegal aliens.

Not only was there a strong positive correlation between pro-alien policies and the size of a state’s foreign-born population, but this association persisted in spite of controls for: race, age, education, unemployment, life expectancy, poverty, IQ, population density, population size, income, rent, housing prices, state tax rates, single parent households, crime rates, subjective well-being, climate, regions of the country, political affiliation, governor affiliation, and the size of a state’s Jewish population (β = 0.41, p < 0.0001). [87] [88]

Put simply, policies enacted by state legislatures appear have a direct impact on how many people immigrate to a state. On the other hand, while the size of a state’s Jewish population may have a profound influence on daily life within state, the evidence suggests that the general Jewish public did not systematically affect state-level immigration within the United States over the past 60 years.

Also consistent with this idea is the cross-sectional finding that states with large Jewish populations were just as likely as those with small populations to have high or low levels of immigrants, when the aforementioned factors were held constant (β = 0.12, p > 0.19). [89]

All things considered, these results are what one would expect if Jews are simply a white subgroup, largely analogous to other white subgroups. Moreover, since the overall size of the Jewish population is a proxy for the number of Jewish elites within a nation, these findings suggest that reducing the number of Jewish elites (or Jews generally) within a nation would not decrease its level of support for open borders.

Reason 4: Jews are Adequately Represented among White Advocates

So far I have found one survey on whites and Jews that could be used to estimate the proportion of race realists within each group. From 1988 to 2014, the General Social Survey asked its respondents “Are Black/White differences in income, housing, and jobs partly due to the fact that most Blacks have less of an inborn ability to learn?” During the 1988-1998 and 2000-2014 periods, Jews were just as likely as the general white population to agree with this statement (unfortunately only about one in 10 people in both groups agreed). [90]

As such, GSS data suggests that, proportionately, there are as many Jewish race realists as gentle race realists.

Still, the extent to which Jews are represented in the WA movement remains an interesting question. When it still published a monthly magazine, American Renaissance conducted a survey of its readership. It found that approximately 3.3 percent of readers were Jewish. [91] Since Jews are roughly 2 percent of the population, this suggests that Jews are slightly overrepresented among supporters of pro-white identity politics. [92]

Additionally, after researching the backgrounds of 75 of the most prominent race realists, several colleagues
and I discovered that about 13 percent could be shown to have Jewish ancestry. \[^{[93]}\] This means that Jews were roughly seven times more likely to be prominent race realists than would be expected by chance alone.

**A Concession to Critics**

The data presented in Section III has one important limitation: it was all collected within the last five decades. The data in this section therefore tell us much about Jews today, but little about Jews in the past. Kevin MacDonald and others have written convincingly about the prominent role Jews played in the efforts that lead up to the Immigration Act of 1965. There can be little doubt that on that occasion Jewish groups—whether or not they were acting in accordance with the wishes of ordinary Jews—were behaving as the Floodgate Theory would predict.

**IV. Why are American Jews so Liberal?**

The fact remains that in many respects American Jews, as a group, are more liberal than gentiles. As mentioned earlier, while Jews in many Western countries tend to be more conservative than gentiles (and while they have also become increasingly conservative over time), there is little doubt that American Jews have been exceptionally liberal over the last century. Why is this large population of Jews so liberal? Why are American Jews different from other diaspora Jews?

**Historical Explanations of Jewish Leftism**

There are reasons to think that selective immigration and anti-Jewish sentiments may help explain part this tendency. In 1882, Russia passed the infamous “May Laws” in response to a series of anti-Jewish riots. \[^{[94]}\] These laws imposed strict limitations on educational and economic opportunities for Jews. The May Laws also restricted the ability of Russian Jews to own and purchase property, or to travel and relocate. Partly as a reaction to these punitive laws, approximately 1.5–2 million Jews fled Tsarist Russia between 1882 and 1914 in search of a better life in the United States. \[^{[95]}\] \[^{[96]}\] Prior to the May Laws (1820–1880), Jewish immigration to the United States totaled around 150,000 persons (most of whom were of Western European origin). \[^{[97]}\] This gives us an average annual rate of Jewish immigration to the US of around 2,420 per year (although the actual rate was probably much lower in the beginning, and higher near the end).

Historians and journalists have often claimed that Jewish immigrants to the United States were singled out for rejection by US immigration authorities during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This was not the case. Between 1899 and 1939, approximately 3 percent of people who immigrated to the US were deported. During the same period, only 0.5 percent of Jewish immigrants were deported. This means Jewish immigrants were only 17 percent as likely to be deported than other immigrants. \[^{[98]}\] Likewise, Jewish immigrants were only 63 percent as likely to be denied entry than the general immigrant population. \[^{[99]}\] \[^{[100]}\]

Before the 1880s, there were roughly 230,000 Jews in the United States. \[^{[101]}\] Over 80 percent appear to have been German or Western European. \[^{[102]}\] \[^{[103]}\] This means that the American Jewish population underwent a profound transformation within the span of just a few decades, as Russian Jews went from a tiny minority of American Jews to the overwhelming majority.

The massive influx of Jewish immigrants into the United States was the direct result of Jewish
perceptions of anti-Semitism in Europe. From the May Laws, to Russian University Quotas, to a wide range of anti-Jewish pogroms, to the eventual victory of the Nazi party in Germany, all of these events are perceived by Jews as acts of oppression perpetrated by gentiles, and each event either preceded (or coincided) with a new wave of Jewish emigration to the United States. Jewish perceptions of anti-Semitism in Europe appear to be a primary reason Eastern European Jews came to the United States. [104]

Paul Gottfried and others have argued that Eastern European Jewish immigrants tended to be leftists and that they also had a preoccupation with combating the kind of anti-Semitism that lead them to flee Russia. [105] [106] We can see some of the more radical examples of Jewish leftism imported from Russia in America’s early anarchist movement. The famous Jewish anarchist, Emma Goldman, was a Russian immigrant. [107] Goldman’s anarchist lover, the would-be assassin Alexander Berkman, was also an immigrant Russian Jew. [108] Other notable American Anarchists of Russian Jewish origin include Sam Dolgoff, [109] Marie Ganz, [110] Mollie Steimer, [111] as well as the prominent trade unionist Rose Pesotta. [112] Any listing of the best known “American” anarchists from the late 19th and early 20th centuries is predominantly a list of Russian Jews. (The Italians Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti are far better known because of their execution in 1927 on what many continue to believe was insufficient evidence. They were not, however, anarchist leaders or ideologues.)

Russian Jews also dominated America’s early socialist movement. David Dubinsky, a founder of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the American Labor Party, and president of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, was a Russian Jew. [113] The labor leader Baruch Vladeck, [114] the union activist Moishe Lewis, [115] the famous journalist Abraham Cahan, [116] the renowned poet and socialist party rep Morris Winchovsky, [117] the pro-Bolshevik editor and communist party founder Moissaye Olgin, [118] and the former leader of the Socialist Party of America Jacob Salutsky [119] – all were prominent Russian Jews. Russian Jews were highly overrepresented among America’s early socialists.

While there were Jews in the United States before Russian immigration, they had no particular reputation as being either subversive or far-left. Northern Jews supported the Republicans in 1868, and at the national level; Jews also supported the GOP in 1896 (at a time when most immigrant Jews could not vote). From the 1860s until the late 1890s, American Jews consistently gave their support to the GOP in presidential elections. Russian Jewish immigrants, on the other hand, overwhelmingly supported the Democratic Party during the last third of the 19th century. [120] [121] Admittedly, being a Republican or a Democrat in the 19th century does not mean the same thing it does today. Nevertheless, this evidence does suggest that the association between Jews and American leftist politics appeared only after the mass immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe.

At first glance, Southern Jews might appear to be the exception, due to their support of the Democrats throughout the 19th century. However, Southern gentiles also voted Democrat with nearly equal frequency. Thus, the profound leftism of American Jews appears to have Russian origins. American Jews displayed no great tendency toward leftist from the mid to late 19th century, and this pattern changed only after the arrival of millions of Jews from Eastern Europe. In other words, selective immigration of leftist Russian Jews to the United States helps explain the propensity of American Jews toward political leftist.

There is also reason to think that American Jewish liberalism is partly a reaction to American circumstances. Some Americans have been open about their dislike for Jews, and the revival of the Ku Klux Klan in the early 20th century worried Jews. The Klan’s resurgence also coincided with the lynching of Leo Frank by an anti-Jewish mob, an event that caused half of Georgia’s Jews to flee the state, and lead to the establishment of the ADL. [122] [123] The Klan was also known to have boycotted Jewish businesses, and to have denounced Jews by means of parades, marches, and lectures. [124] [125]
At the height of the second Klan’s power, it had between 3 and 8 million members. From childhood onward, most Jews have repeatedly been exposed to “the story of Jewish oppression.” Jewish intellectuals have compiled long lists of atrocities against the Jewish people, most of them perpetrated by European Christians. Jewish educators use this to instill a sense of Jewish identity in younger generations of Jews.

Reactionary Explanations of Jewish Liberalism

A feature of unique importance to Jewish perceptions of anti-Semitism is the history of conflict between Jews and Christians. Christian anti-Semitism goes back at least as far as the First Council of Nicaea in 325 AD. An assembly of Christian bishops organized by Emperor Constantine and proposing to represent all of Christendom concluded, in the words of Constantine, that:

“[B]ecause their hands having been stained with the crime [of Jesus’s crucifixion], the minds of these wretched men [the Jews] are necessarily blinded . . . . Let us, then, have nothing in common with the Jews, who are our adversaries . . . avoiding all contact with that evil way . . . who, after having compassed the death of the Lord, being out of their minds, are guided not by sound reason, but by an unrestrained passion, wherever their innate madness carries them . . . . Therefore, this irregularity must be corrected, in order that we may no more have any thing in common with those parricides and the murderers of our Lord . . . no single point in common with the perjury of the Jews.”

In 1492, Queen Isabel and King Ferdinand jointly issued the Alhambra Degree ordering Jews, upon pain of death, to convert to Christianity or leave Spain. Between 1100 and 1800 AD, Jews were expelled more than 1,350 times from various European cities. Christians also expropriated property from Jews, killed them, and passed laws that targeted Jews in unfavorable ways.
Additional signs of Jewish distaste for Christianity can be seen in their high level of support for the separation of church and state, and in their low levels of confidence in organized religion.

**Agreement with the Supreme Court’s Prohibitions on Prayer in Schools**

[Source: Tom Smith, General Social Survey 1991-2002]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Percentage Agreeing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black (n=2,228)</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other White</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German (n=2,662)</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic (n=1,033)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>French (n=516)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>British (n=2,254)</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish (n=351)</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish (n=1,631)</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (n=140)</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian (n=395)</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian (n=779)</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian (n=556)</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish (n=333)</td>
<td>37%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Jews vs. Gentiles: Attitudes Towards the Separation of Church and State (1)**

[Source: Attitudes of American Jews in Comparative Perspective – A Follow-Up Study (2000)]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Percentage Agreeing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gentiles (n=501)</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews (n=837)</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Jews vs. Gentiles: Attitudes Towards the Separation of Church and State (2)**

[Source: Attitudes of American Jews in Comparative Perspective – A Follow-Up Study (2000)]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Jews (n=837)</td>
<td>49%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Jews vs. Gentiles: Attitudes Towards the Separation of Church and State (3)**

[Source: Attitudes of American Jews in Comparative Perspective – A Follow-Up Study (2000)]

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<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Percentage Agreeing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gentiles (n=501)</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews (n=837)</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Within multicultural or multiracial societies, perceived hostility from other groups makes a person more likely to support policies designed to exclude or to reduce the power of those groups. All else being equal, this general pattern of intergroup dynamics suggests the following:

1. The more Christians there are, the more anti-Semitism Jews will perceive.

2. The less anti-Semitism Jews perceive; the more right-wing Jews will be.

3. The fewer Christians there are, the more right-wing Jews will be.

4. The fewer Christians there are, the more likely are Jews to vote for the right.

If Jews react to perceived outgroup hostility, real or imagined, by adopting ideologies that run counter to those of their supposed haters, and if Jews perceive outgroup hostility from Christians, then a greater percentage of Jews will identify with the right when there are relatively fewer Christians.

There is evidence for this view. Between 1997 and 2015, there was a strong negative correlation at the national level ($r = -0.77$, $p < 0.0001$) between Christians as a percentage of the US population, and the percentage of American Jews who say that anti-Semitism is not a problem in the United States. In other words, when Jews are surrounded by large numbers of Christians, they tend to think anti-Semitism is a problem, and to think it is less of a problem as the number of Christians declines.

Between 1997 and 2015, there was also a strong negative correlation at the national level ($r = -0.63$, $p <0.01$) between Christians as a percentage of the population, and the percentage of American Jews who identify with the right. The regression line suggests that a ten-point decrease in the US Christian population roughly corresponds to a six-point increase in the share of American Jews who identify with the right.
Between 2004 and 2015, there was a sharp drop in the amount of anti-Semitism American Jews perceived from the European far right. At the same time, there was also an increase in the percentage of American Jews who identified with the American right, and both changes were statistically significant. In other words, reduced Jewish perceptions of anti-Semitism from the European far right seem to correspond with increased identification with the right. These facts are entirely consistent with the view that Jewish leftism is, at least in part, a reaction to Jewish perceptions of others. 

It should also be noted that the percentage of American Jews who believe that anti-Semitism is not a problem in the US has virtually tripled since 1997 (admittedly, from a very low level), increasing at a linear rate of about eight percentage points per decade (r = 0.86, p <0.0001).

At the international level, the available data on religious demographics and Jewish politics seem to fit the predictions of “Reaction Theory.” While estimates vary, roughly 72 percent of Americans identify as Christian. Thus, the United States has both the most heavily Christian population of any first world country, and the largest liberal Jewish population of any developed country.
In every white country in which Jews identify as conservative, Christians tend to be a smaller proportion of the population. As mentioned previously, Jews in Canada, Australia, the UK, and France, tend to be more conservative than the general white population. Only 67 percent of Canadians, 153 64 percent of Australians, 154 60 percent of people in Britain, 155 and 65 percent of the French identify as Christians. 156 Actual Christian observance in those countries is probably lower than the figures suggest, making the social presence of Christianity considerably less salient than in the United States. Data from these countries show a strong negative relationship (r = -0.95, p <0.02) between Christians as a share of a country’s population, and the share of a nation’s Jewish voters who vote for right-wing parties – though results from such small samples should be interpreted with caution. 157

The Christian share of the US population has been declining since the 1940s. The downward trend is very strong, and shows no sign of stopping. 158 The general US trend away from Christianity does not merely reflect changes to the racial mix of the country – because whites are less likely than Blacks and Hispanics to be Christians. Whites are also more likely than both groups to be irreligious. 159 Therefore, the reduction in the Christian share of the population is best explained by a general decline in religion across all groups. As such, the decline of Christianity can be expected to lead an increasing share of American Jews joining the right.

Israelis are strikingly more conservative than American Jews and only one sixth as likely to consider themselves leftists. There are no doubt many reasons for this, but the small number of Jews living in Israel—

![Christianity and Jewish Support for the Right by Country](chart.png)

\[
y = -2.367x + 2.0625 \\
R^2 = 0.8375 \\
p <0.05
\]

only 2 percent of the population—may be a factor. 160 161

**POLITICAL LEANINGS: AMERICAN JEWS VS. ISRAELI JEWS**

*Pew Research Center (2014)*

(Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals)

Although Israel was created partly as a reaction to the Holocaust, Israeli Jews appear to view “remembering the Holocaust” as less essential to being Jewish than American Jews. They also view working for “equality” and “social justice” as far less necessary to being Jewish. Similarly, British Jews view Holocaust remembrance and support for social justice as less quintessentially Jewish than their American counterparts. 162 163 It is probably not a coincidence that Britain has fewer Christians than the United States, and that British Jews are considerably more right-wing than American Jews.

**Clarification on Christianity**

Although I am not religious, it is not my intention to celebrate the decline of Christianity, nor am I suggesting that Christianity would have to disappear for Jews to abandon the left. I am merely trying to show that part of the reason American Jews are liberal is perceived hostility—justified or not—from conservative Christians.

I do not think Jewish suspicion of Christianity is inevitable. Christians do not have to stop being Christians to bring Jews towards the right. If Christians persuaded Jews that Christianity is not a threat to them, or if they made a compelling argument that the real threat is from Muslims and other Third-World immigrants, this might help bring Jews to the right.

**Perceptions of Anti-Semitism from Universities and Jewish Liberalism**

One element of Jewish liberalism gives us reason to think that the reactionary character of Jewish political
life may be turning Jews against the left. The idea came to me when I learned that there was no correlation between the amount of anti-Semitism Jews thought currently existed in the US, and the expectations Jews had that anti-Semitism would increase in the future. How could this be? Surely, people who think there is a lot of anti-Semitism in the United States would also tend to think anti-Semitism will increase. Instead, it may be that many Jews have different sets of people in mind when they think about who is responsible for current anti-Semitism and who will be responsible for future increases in anti-Semitism.

I discovered several articles written by Jewish intellectuals discussing what they called “the new anti-Semitism.” The thrust of these articles is that college campuses have started to become new “hotbeds” of anti-Semitism, and that student and faculty opposition to the state of Israel leads to anti-Semitism. [164][165][166][167][168]

Probably no one believes that any systematic political activity on college campuses is anything other than left-wing, a fact also hinted at by several Jewish intellectuals who have studied campus “anti-Semitism”. [169] [170] [171] Thus, if Jews have “anti-Semitic” college campuses in mind when they fear a rise in anti-Semitism, and, if Jews tend to adopt reactionary positions against the ideology of their opponents, then Jews who expect more anti-Semitism in the future should tend to identify with the right. Anti-Semitism from the left, therefore, should push Jews closer to the right.

To test this idea, I examined the percentage of Jews who believed, during the late 1990s and 2000s, that anti-Semitism would increase in the future, as well as the percentage of American Jews who identified with the right. [172] [173] I discovered that in five of the six cases in which there had been an increasing share of Jews expecting anti-Semitism to rise, the share of Jews who identified with the right had also increased. Furthermore, in all of the three cases in which expectations of anti-Semitism declined, the percentage of Jews who identified with the right also declined.

These findings are consistent with a causal relationship. In eight of the nine cases in which there was a change from the previous year, expectations regarding anti-Semitism either preceded or were concurrent with the effect in the predicted direction. The overall correlation between these variables was also very strong (r = 0.86, p <0.002). The regression line roughly suggests that every ten-point increase in the share of Jews who expect increasing anti-Semitism leads to a seven-point increase in the share of Jews who identify with the right. Moreover, these results remain virtually unchanged when one controls for the year.

Traditionally, expectations of increased anti-Semitism have pushed Jews towards the left. The fact that such expectations are associated with a move to the right suggests that the perceived current source of increasing anti-Semitism is the left. These data do not prove a causal relationship, but they make one plausible. As the left is increasingly perceived as a source of anti-Semitism, more Jews could move towards the right.

Education and Irreligiosity as an Origin of Jewish Leftism

Jewish liberalism may have something to do with group differences in education and religiosity. Education is associated with liberalism, and Jews are more educated than any other group. At the same time, religiosity is associated with conservatism, and of all American religious groups, Jews are the least religious, in terms of how likely they are to attend religious services, believe in God, interpret the word of their holy book literally, etc. [174]

By using large datasets from Reuters and Ipsos surveys, I was able to control for these variables directly, by limiting my analysis to gentiles and Jews with the same levels of religiosity and education. Without these controls, the normalized liberalism/conservatism gap between Jews and the
general white population was about 19 percentage points. Controlling for religiosity reduced the gaps to seven percentage points, but the residual difference was still statistically significant.

However, after controlling for religiosity and education, group differences in political orientations shrank close to zero. In other words, differences in education and religiosity between European Jews and the general white population could explain the entire gap in liberalism and conservatism between both groups. Therefore, while the exact mechanism is still unknown, a partial answer to the question, “Why are American Jews so liberal?” seems to be, “It’s because they are more educated and less religious than gentiles.”

In Section I, on Jewish Separatism, I discussed responses to 29 questions on race-related social policy. The correlation between the Jewish response percentages on these questions and the corresponding responses of irreligious gentiles was \( r = 0.94 \) (\( p < 10^{-10} \)), the highest correlation of any two ethnic or religious group by far. It is almost as if anyone who wants to know what Jews think on most subjects need only ask a college-educated gentile atheist.

Furthermore, the idea that group difference in religiosity and education is partly responsible for American Jewish liberalism is consistent with comparisons of Jews in several different countries. For example, Israeli Jews are more religious, less educated, and far more right wing than their American counterparts. Relative to American Jews, they are 13 times more likely to be high school dropouts, 1.4 times less likely to have a bachelor’s degree, and 2.3 times less likely to have a postgraduate degree. As noted above, Israeli Jews are only one-sixth as likely to identify with the political left.

Likewise, both British and Canadian Jews tend to be less educated and more religious than American Jews. And as we’ve already noted, Jews from both of these countries are more conservative than American Jews.

These facts should temper our views. Some in the WA movement strongly believe that the Jewish public is uniquely responsible for promoting diversity, multiculturalism, and mass immigration. Some even propose that Jews be expelled to prevent the harm they cause.

On the other hand, I know of no one who favors deporting irreligious or highly educated gentiles because of their sentiments on immigration or anything else. White advocates themselves tend to be
irreligious and well educated, and their views of irreligious whites are similar to their views of other white subgroups: They must be persuaded of the legitimacy of defending our interests.\textsuperscript{[185]}

American Jews have views on immigration that are virtually identical to those of irreligious white gentiles.\textsuperscript{[186]} If irreligious, highly-educated whites should not be scorned on the grounds that some of them have the wrong attitudes on immigration, why single out Jews?

**Age and Perceived Anti-Semitism as a Source of Jewish Liberalism**

A natural tendency for all groups is for liberalism to decline with age, and for conservatism to increase with age. This is true for Baptists, Presbyterians, Lutherans, Methodists, Catholics, Episcopalians, irreligious people, and even for people of “other religions.” (The only exceptions is Mormons, who are highly conservative at all ages, and atheists, who tend to grow more liberal as they get older.) It is true for men and women and for whites, Hispanics, and Asians. This pattern also holds regardless of education or income.

However, if perceptions of outgroup hostility from the ethnic majority give rise to reactionary liberal attitudes in minority groups, we would expect liberalism to increase with age in blacks and Jews. Put another way, if leftism in minority groups is partly a reaction to perceived hostility from the majority, then we would not expect to see the normal association between age and conservatism. This is because there are two significant events responsible for these groups’ perception of hostility from the dominant group. Specifically, the closer Jews are to the Holocaust, and blacks to the Civil Rights Era, the more liberal we can expect them to be. At the very least, blacks and Jews in the oldest age brackets should be more liberal than many of their younger counterparts.

Results from political surveys in the United States are consistent with this prediction. Data from Reuters/Ipsos polls reveal a negative correlation between age and conservatism among blacks and Jews, while they show a positive correlation between age and conservatism for other ethnic and religious groups. What’s more, even when the correlations aren’t perfectly linear, the data reveal a precipitous decline in liberalism among Jews in the oldest age category compared to younger age brackets.\textsuperscript{[187]} Both blacks and Jews over 60 tend to be less conservative and more liberal than both their twenty-something and fifty-something counterparts. The Pew Research Center has also found that liberalism increases with age for blacks and Jews, yet declines with age for virtually every other group.\textsuperscript{[188]} [189] [190] [191] [192]
If minority groups perceive less hostility over time, one would predict that older members should be less conservative and more liberal than their younger counterparts. This is because, unlike younger Jews, older Jews still remember outgroup hostility from the past. These memories influence their political ideology as well as their current perceptions of outgroup hostility. This would explain why older Jews perceive more anti-Semitism despite being less likely than younger Jews to have experienced it during the last 12 months. 

![Female Conservatives as a Percentage of the Population by Age and Race](image1)

.Persistent leftism in elderly Jews in spite of massive public attitude improvements toward Jews, is consistent with the idea that perceptions of outgroup hostility have broken the natural link between conservatism and age. Older Jews also see “Remembering the Holocaust” and “working towards social justice and equality” as more quintessentially Jewish than their younger counterparts. 

![Conservatism by Age and Religious Affiliation](image2)

The Holocaust’s role in Jewish leftism may also be associated with cultural assumptions about Evangelicals. Jews tend to view Evangelical Christianity as a shallow religion that gives feeble-minded people an undue sense of certainty and self-importance. This is a mentality many Jews associate with the perpetrators of the Holocaust, and the continuing prominence of Evangelical Christianity may encourage older Jews to hold on to outmoded
views of the persistence of potentially homicidal Christian anti-Semitism.

While the precise reasons for American Jewish liberalism are complex and interconnected, the Holocaust seems to have resulted in a kind of static reactionary leftistism in elderly Jews, just as the Civil Rights era has for blacks. [199] [200]

V. Suggestions on Approaches to the Jewish Question

Suggestion 1: Do not give it undue importance.

Why do white advocates espouse broad anti-Jewish narratives? By broad anti-Jewish narratives (BANs), I mean attacks on Jews that emphasize a person’s Jewishness or that criticize Jews in general, as opposed to attacking someone simply for being anti-white.

Some white advocates argue that it is important to “name the Jew” because we must identify “the enemy.” As I have argued above, there is strong evidence that even if elite Jews and Jewish intellectuals have been especially active in anti-white efforts, ordinary Jews identify as white and hold views that do not differ greatly from those of gentiles. At the same time, many gentiles in the media and in universities are actively working against white interests.

But even if Jews really were “the enemy,” what is accomplished by naming them? Do anti-Jewish WAs think that “naming the Jew” will result in such a tidal wave of anti-Jewish feeling that Jews will no longer be hired in media or cultural positions?

Or do they think that by promoting BANs, they can teach gentiles to identify Jews and disregard what they say because they are Jews? First of all, it would obviously be wrong to disregard all opinions of all Jews. Some Jews agree with us. And if promoting BANs is supposed to make gentiles “Jew-wise,” so they can sift through statements by Jews and separate anti-white deception from the truth, this presupposes an ability to separate anti-white deception from the truth, whatever the source. As I note below, almost all WAs arrive at an understanding of race before they come to any conclusions at all about Jews. They can therefore recognize anti-white deceptions regardless of the source.

If the reason for “naming the Jew” is to point out that Jews are more likely than gentiles to express anti-white views, I would point out that American society can be divided into many groups, some of which are much more likely than others to take anti-white positions: Episcopalians more so than Southern Baptists, college professors more so than auto workers, women more so than men, Democrats more so than Republicans, etc. I would argue that the view of non-elite Jews on race are not so different from those of gentiles as to merit special scrutiny.

Furthermore, although one of the basic assumptions of WAs—myself included—is that Jews have certainly been pioneers in promoting anti-white thinking, are elite Jews today really that much more anti-white than elite gentiles? There may be some way to answer this question empirically, but until that research is done, it is worth pointing out that it has become almost as easy to find sick, anti-white statements from elite gentiles as from Jews.

Bill Clinton looks forward to the day when the United States has no majority race. [201] The Army’s chief of staff, General George Casey, says he believes that “the strength of our Army comes from our diversity.” [202] Joschka Fischer, the former foreign minister and vice chancellor of Germany says his country should be “contained from outside and heterogenized from the inside by influx, ‘diluted’ so to speak.” [203] John Gorton, the former Prime Minister of Australia says “if we build up gradually inside Australia, a proportion of people without white skins, then there will be a complete lack of consciousness that it is being built up . . . . [W]e will [then] . . . have a multi-racial country without racial tensions, perhaps the first in the world.” [204] Thomas Eriksen, a professor of social anthropology at the University of Oslo says, “The most important blank spot exists now in deconstructing the majority so thoroughly that it can never be called the majority again . . . . Something like this could contribute to both understanding and liberation.” [205]

Syndicated columnist Maggie Gallagher says, “I hate the idea of being white. I never think of myself as belonging to the ‘white race.’ Those who do, in my experience, are invariably second-raters, seeking solace for their own failures. I can think of few things more degrading than being proud to be white.” [206] Peter Sutherland is a former attorney general of Ireland, and the UN’s Special Representative for International Migration. He says: “The United States, or Australia and New Zealand, are migrant societies and therefore they accommodate more readily those from other backgrounds than we do ourselves, who still nurse a sense of our homogeneity and difference.
from others. And that’s precisely what the European Union, in my view, should be doing its best to undermine.”

This list could be much longer. It is increasingly less defensible to single out Jews for special criticism because of their anti-white vitriol.

Another reason I can imagine for promoting BANs would be to protect any future white institution, community, or ethnostate that we might establish. BANs would build up support for excluding Jews early so there will already be political support for excluding them from whatever was established.

Purveyors of BANs fear that if Jews remain in an ethnostate, for example, they will subvert it from within. Jewish elites have historically been good at promoting dissent and exerting negative influences on popular culture. Elite Jews have also been able to accomplish these things far out of proportion to their numbers. The risk of permitting a Jewish fifth column to remain within an ethnostate would therefore be too great.

In my view, this view errs on two fronts. As I have argued above, there is good reason to think that the general Jewish public is not a fifth column within white societies. Also, setting aside the moral issue of excluding Jews, such a policy makes sense only if one makes two assumptions: First, that Jews cannot be successfully brought into a white consciousness movement, and second, that Jews would want to stay in a white community or ethnostate.

I think the first assumption is wrong given the wealth of evidence presented above. However, if Jews remained extremely anti-white uber-leftists, and even if they couldn’t be brought into our movement, they would surely leave an ethnostate or community once it was established.

From this point of view, trying to influence people with broadly anti-Jewish narratives is not a productive use of time. After all, if the “anti-Semites” are wrong, they’re wrong, and if they’re right (and if they win), they gain nothing by peddling BANs given that what they want is something that would happen anyway.

Finally, some WAs may think the real benefit of BANs is not to build support for excluding Jews, but that they are an effective tactic for persuading more people of Race Realism, the ills of diversity, and the need to defend white interests. In other words, we will convince more people of our core arguments by trying to explain the behavior of Jews.

I find this implausible. In my own case, although I heard both sets of arguments at roughly the same time, I was convinced of the core ideas of Race Realism long before I reached any conclusions about Jews. In addition, I have spoken to a fair number of people within the movement with a wide range of views on the Jewish question. When I have asked them to describe what led them to white advocacy, the answer is always the same: First, they were persuaded by arguments about race that had nothing to do with Jews, even if they heard arguments about Jews at roughly the same time. Virtually everyone I know who eventually came to an unorthodox view of Jews did so only after arriving at unorthodox views on race. They initially found the arguments about race far more compelling.

I think the view that “anti-Jewish narratives” help persuade people of our other positions on race is backwards. A dissident view on race leads, instead, to a dissident view of Jews.

It is also worth pointing out that none of our core positions logically depend on whatever we may think about Jews. Whether Race Realism is true has nothing to do with the effects of Jews on Western societies. Whether diversity is a strength or weakness is independent of Jewish activities. The moral legitimacy of freedom of association and the danger of the double standard of whites being the only group prohibited from defending their interests are independent notions that do not require any particular conclusions about Jews.

Given the logical independence of the Jewish question, given the fact that negative arguments about Jews do not make our core positions more persuasive, and given that broadly anti-Jewish narratives would do almost nothing to protect an institution or ethnostate from Jews, I see no benefit in advancing BANs.

What are the costs of advancing these narratives? The most obvious is that it drives away pro-white European Jews and sympathetic Jewish fence sitters. As noted earlier, Jews are slightly overrepresented among racially conscious whites, adequately represented among race realists generally, and highly overrepresented among elite race realists. Moreover, there are several prominent Jews who have tirelessly promoted our cause, often at great personal expense. These include people such as Byron Roth, Mayer Schiller, Michael Levin, Paul Gottfried, and Robert
Weissberg. These men have all spoken at American Renaissance conferences. What do we gain by alienating them and the community they represent?

More recently, other Jews have helped promote race-realist, anti-orthodox thinking. Steven Miller, Donald Trump’s senior policy advisor and warm-up speaker at his rallies, is Jewish. [208] Although he is certainly not an open race realist, many of his statements seem to reflect a level of understanding of race that is more advanced and sophisticated than that of Mr. Trump, and more closely aligned with WA views. Whether he would see himself in that role or not, he is doing more practical good for whites today than any of the presumed “leaders” of our movement.

Milo Yiannopoulos, the flamboyant Breitbart writer and campus speaker, is Jewish on his mother’s side. [209] Although his goal often seems to be to provoke outrage any way he can, his open assault on taboos is very helpful in breaking down resistance to WA ideas. We hurt our own cause if we refuse to cooperate with such people or create an aura around our ideas that scares away other Jews who might play similar roles.

At the same time, I have never seen a WA point out a Jewish angle on some issue in a way that persuaded a normal person of anything he was not already inclined to believe. I fully agree with Jared Taylor when he says, “I don’t think that in the United States you gain any points if you’re in a debate with someone, and you point out the Jewish element.” [210] I would go further. Pointing out the Jewish element to the unconvinced is counterproductive. Most people see any mention of Jews as a crackpot conspiracy theory that is unworthy of consideration. Although I have seen exceptions, the pattern seems to be that bringing up the Jewish Question in the manner WAs do reduces our credibility.

Finally, attacking Jews plays into the hands of people who accuse us of being “Neo-Nazis.” Any accusation of “Nazism” that a reasonable person would find plausible marks someone as an unhinged fanatic whose opinions can be ignored. Nothing is better calculated to drive away potential comrades than siegheiling and swastikas, and anyone who doesn’t realize this has such bad judgment he probably cannot be trusted to get much of anything right.

There are some in our movement who do not go so far as to wear armbands, but who are nevertheless obsessed with Jews. They refuse to believe that Jews ever act with goodwill towards gentiles. They see Jewish influence behind every anti-white statement and every anti-white event in history. This is like what many blacks think about whites: that we are behind everything that has ever gone wrong for any black person anytime, anywhere. Blacks go to ludicrous lengths to shift all the blame for their failures onto whites, and some WAs do the same with Jews. It may comfort some whites to blame an “enemy” for all our troubles, but this can lead to shirking responsibility for our own deficiencies, and is a distraction from the work we must do to awaken and encourage our people.

Remember: Our goal is to advance our own interests. We need not work against the interests of others unless doing so advances our own. Some anti-Jewish WAs become so fixated on “the enemy” that they act as if thwarting the interest of Jews were more important than advancing our own. For example, they are pleased by any setback for Israel; they are pleased because Jews support Israel and they oppose anything Jews support.

WAs should support Israel insofar as it is a shining example of an ethnostate, of the kind of ethnic self-determination we want for ourselves and for all people. This is one of the reasons the successful European nationalist parties such as the Danish Peoples Party, the Sweden Democrats, and the French National Front support Israel. There may well be grounds to criticize the behavior of the government of Israel and there may be legitimate reasons to oppose American policies as they relate to Israel, but these are different questions.

There may also be reasons to notice and criticize American Jewish support for pro-Israel foreign policy measures that may harm our relations with other countries or may not be in American interests. The same standards would apply to efforts by Americans of Irish or Pakistani origin, for example, to influence American foreign policy in narrowly partisan directions. The concept of a Jewish state, however, is one that all WAs should support.

BANs lead to another danger. To paraphrase a friend, “It’s always more fun for delinquents to hate the people above them than it is to hate those below them.” If we keep advancing BANs, we will attract unsavory whites. They will not be people with a carefully considered view of Jews, but dimwits who think in simple slogans. Hate, intemperance, and passion will drive many of them, and, when they inevitably make bad decisions, this will confirm the negative stereotypes our enemies peddle about us.
There is one more consideration. As I pointed out in a previous section, there is strong evidence that the political views of Jews are influenced by their perception of the level of anti-Semitism in the society around them and by their perception of who holds anti-Semitic views. When anti-Semitism was associated with the right there can be no doubt that it pushed Jews towards the left. Now that it is associated with left and Islam, it pushes Jews towards the right.

The rise of what has been called the Alt Right may be changing this. It has always been possible to find websites that attack Jews in harsh, contemptuous terms. Such sites have usually been treated as insignificant curiosities. Now, for the first time, some of these sentiments are appearing in enough Twitter feeds to attract mainstream attention. There have also been campaigns to direct these sentiments directly at Jewish authors and commentators.

Young Jews, in particular, have no memory of the Holocaust, and are likely to associate anti-Semitism almost exclusively with Islam and the left. It is not hard to imagine their shock at finding swastikas adorned “Gas the kikes” and “Into the oven” messages in their inboxes or Twitter feeds. While much this is irreverent humor meant to mock the establishment, many Jews will interpret such messages literally.

It does not help our movement when young Jews who used to laugh at their grandparents’ warnings begin to take them seriously, and to believe that the goyim really can be stirred at a moment’s notice into genocidal frenzies. To the extent that the caricature of the hand-rubbing Jew plotting the corruption and eventual destruction of white people ever had any validity, it would have arisen out of this fear: that somewhere in the hearts of all gentiles is a yearning to exterminate Jews.

This fear has been ebbing for decades. If it is rekindled, it is likely to push some Jews towards precisely the kind of anti-white activity some WAs associate with all Jews. Jews who think WAs want to kill them are not going to be pay any attention to our views no matter how reasonable or sensible. Jew/gentile relations have a long history and it is not my purpose to attribute blame. However, promoting BANs, and doing so in harsh, violent language may have the potential to create a monster, to frighten Jews into the worst kind of anti-white behavior. BANs are jarring to most gentiles. Their effect on Jews is likely to be electrifying.

Advancing BANs could make some Jews more leftist, more anti-white, and even bigger opponents of our movement. Even if one favors excluding Jews from our cause, and even if one maintains that Jews will always be hostile to white interests, nothing is gained by actions that (a) create more enemies and (b) confuse and alienate whites. Surely our time is better spent recruiting more whites to our point of view.

For all these reasons, I think arguments against Jews hurt our cause. I think we will be far more successful sticking to our core arguments about Race Realism, the ills of diversity, and the vital importance of white identity. Without compromising our ideas or integrity, we should do all we can to make our message easier for normal white people to understand and accept. Talking about Jews makes our ideas that much harder to swallow than they already are.

While we should never fail to criticize anyone who is anti-white, we should focus on those specific anti-white things the offender said or did, not who he is. Unless there is a very good reason to do otherwise, we should ignore the fact that an opponent may be a Jew. If we bring up the Jewish question, ordinary white people will find it at least distracting and probably distasteful. They will not think this is a legitimate attack on anti-white behavior. Instead, they will see it as an attack on Jews in general, which means our message gets bogged down and loses focus. Also, anyone who is attacked in this way can turn the tables by portraying himself as a victimized Jew rather than an anti-white.

I certainly do not agree with Oswald Mosely on all questions, but I endorse the following statement, [211]
“I am not an anti-Semite. Anti-Semitism is hatred of Jews on account of their race. I attack some Jews on account of what they do, but I never attack any Jew on account of his birth. I never attack a man on account of his race or religion. If a Jew does something against the interests of Britain or of Europe, he should be attacked like anyone else. He should not be attacked because he is a Jew, but equally he should not be immune from criticism because he is a Jew.”

There may sometimes be ways in which the Jewish background of an anti-white person can be used to make our attacks more persuasive, but these exceptions almost exclusively involve hypocrisy. If a Jewish anti-white activist supports ethnic nationalism for Jews and Israel but opposes it for whites, then pointing out his Jewish background shows he is a hypocrite. However, unless an opponent’s Jewishness can be used to damage his credibility without damaging our own, it is not helpful to mention it. Just criticize him for being anti-white.

To reiterate, BANs have few or no benefits and serious costs. There is the loss of allies caused by alienating European Jews and the likelihood of pushing Jews toward anti-white behavior. There is the time wasted learning and publicizing the misdeeds of Jews, which could be better spent convincing people of our basic arguments. There is the damage done by undesirables who are attracted to anti-Jewish messages. And there is the needless alienation of fair-minded white men and women who are put off by attacks on Jews.

Suggestion 2: Meet Prof. MacDonald’s standards or keep your ideas of Jews to yourself

Regardless of your views on the Jewish question, all of us should be able to agree that some people in our movement needlessly alienate normal people by using extreme language about Jews. Prof. MacDonald himself has said the following: “I agree with the point that a lot of people who don’t like Jews express their views poorly. I have often thought that anyone who hasn’t read a lot in the area and has an IQ of less than 120 should not be allowed to discuss Jewish issues.”

I do not wish to interpret Prof. MacDonald’s statement unfairly, but 91 percent of the white population has an IQ of less than 120. Of the remaining 9 percent, probably fewer than one in five has “read a lot about Jewish issues.” This means that very few people are qualified, by Prof. MacDonald’s standards, to discuss Jewish issues.

Even if you think Jews have no role in white advocacy—a position with which I obviously disagree—please consider the fact that attacking Jews will turn away people who might otherwise be sympathetic. A forceful statement promoting a position that is soundly condemned by virtually all elements of society is likely to be forcefully rejected.

Our movement is at a critical point. It has more momentum today than at any time in the last half century. As we gain prominence and attention, it is more important than ever to have a sane, attractive message. And we have very little time. Whether our race and civilization survive is up to the generation now in their 20s and 30s. We cannot afford to make mistakes, because if we fail, there will be no turning back. Extreme, self-indulgent statements hurt our image, alienate potential allies, and give ammunition to our opponents.

We are deeply in earnest about preserving and carrying forward our race’s priceless legacy of thousands of years of struggle and sacrifice. I appeal to all of my white comrades to reflect on what I have written, and to rededicate themselves to that great calling to which honor and duty compel us: the fight for our people.

Methodology

1: Primary Data Sources

For conventional theories of the Jewish question to qualify as scientific, they must be supported (or falsified) scientifically. Statistics are the best evidence for evaluating conventional theories. Therefore, I used survey evidence from a variety of independent sources to test whether conventional theories about Jews withstand empirical scrutiny. Here are some of my sources:

(A) The General Social Survey

The General Social Survey (GSS) is a comprehensive survey conducted by the University of Chicago. It is designed to measure the attitudes and demographic characteristics of people in the United States. The GSS has been conducted continuously since 1972, and is one of the most widely used tools in contemporary social science research.

(B) Online Reuters/Ipsos Polls

Since January 2012, Reuters and Ipsos, firms specializing in news and opinion polling, have hosted...
a large online survey known as the “Reuters Polling Explorer.” The explorer tracks the views of Americans on a wide variety of issues, from presidential politics, to the Oscars, to the Syrian refugee crisis, and social media.

Ipsos and Reuters polls have a strong record of accuracy. During the 2012 US Presidential Election, online surveys from Reuters and Ipsos predicted the outcome of the election more accurately than all 27 of their major competitors. Online Ipsos surveys have also been accurate predictors of national elections all across the globe. Additional evidence for the general accuracy of Reuters polls, and their surveys of Jewish subsamples, can be found at the following citation.

(C) The Survey of American Jewish Public Opinion

The Survey of American Jewish Public Opinion is a large annual survey published by the American Jewish Committee (AJC). Its primary function is to assess attitudes of American Jews on issues of concern to the Jewish community.

(D) The American Jewish Yearbook

The American Jewish Yearbook is a recently discontinued annual report published by the American Jewish Committee. The yearbook was published for more than a century, from 1899 until 2008. Its purpose was to paint a detailed demographic portrait of native Jews and Jewish immigrants to the United States.

(E) Other Sources

Other data come from the Pew Research Center, a non-partisan research organization dedicated to “data-driven social science research.” Additional data come from Gallup, other reputable pollsters, and demographic surveys.

Bibliography

1 Primary Datasets used throughout this essay
- (D) Jewish Immigration to the United States (1881-1960): http://tinyurl.com/j7tt8lq
- (G) Jew-Gentile Foreign Policy Attitude Comparisons (2012-2016): http://tinyurl.com/z858uas


3 Contact Email: HomelandProjectUS@gmail.com

4 I identified European Jews by selecting Jews who identified as white, and by excluding Jews who identified as “black,” “Hispanic,” “Asian,” “mixed,” or “other.” Excluding non-European Jews from a sample typically produced sample size reductions of about 1 to 9 percent. I did not exclude non-European Jews from a sample if doing so would reduce the already small Jewish sample to the point that results might not be reliable. In some cases, it was impossible to exclude non-European Jews from a sample because the necessary data were not available.

5 Asserting that a group consists of “gentiles” implies that it has no Jews. However, it is rarely possible to exclude Jews from samples of self-identified whites. On the other hand, only 3 percent of self-identified whites have a Jewish background. Given that 97 percent of self-identified whites are not Jewish, the “general white population” seems to be a reasonably good proxy for “white gentiles.”


7 High intelligence may, in part, explain high Jewish levels of trust. Across the American population, there is a high correlation between intelligence and trust, and European Jews are well known to be the most intelligent American subgroup. Noah Carl and Francesco C. Biliari, “Generalized Trust and Intelligence in the United States,” PLOS One, March 11, 2014
Since the majority of people are Christian, this fact is somewhat misleading. Part of the Christian tendency to “marry-in” can be explained by the fact that there are fewer non-Christians for Christians to marry than there are gentiles for Jews to marry. That said, since Jews occupy the same share of the population they did in 1950, this implies that the rate of Jewish intermarriage has increased faster than the rate of Christian intermarriage.

Undoubtedly there are proportionally more gentiles for Jews to marry than there are non-Christians for Christians to marry.

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9 Since the majority of people are Christian, this fact is somewhat misleading. Part of the Christian tendency to “marry-in” can be explained by the fact that there are fewer non-Christians for Christians to marry than there are gentiles for Jews to marry. That said, since Jews occupy the same share of the population they did in 1950, this implies that the rate of Jewish intermarriage has increased faster than the rate of Christian intermarriage.

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12 Reuters/Ipsos. (2013). Society & Lifestyle: *Is your Spouse or partner of different race or ethnicity?* Retrieved June 17, 2015. I aggregated all of Reuters’ partner data for whites (n = 13,184) and Jews (n = 334) between July 24, 2013 and December 17, 2013. I restricted individuals in both samples to respondents who were married. I also restricted the Jewish sample to Jews who identified as white. The results showed that approximately 93 percent of married Jews in the sample (n = 334) were married to a white person, as where 94 percent of whites generally (n = 13,184). Combining these results with the Pew Jewish intermarriage data from the previous citation, I estimated that 84-88 percent of intermarried Jews were married to another white person. A detailed explanation of how I came to this conclusion can be found here: http://tinyurl.com/hoza6ma.


14 Smith, Tom W, Peter Marsden, Michael Hout, and Jibum Kim. *General Social Surveys*, 1972-2014 [machine-readable data file] Principal Investigator, Tom W. Smith; Co-Principal Investigator, Peter V. Marsden; Co-Principal Investigator, Michael Hout; Sponsored by National Science Foundation. -NORC ed. - Chicago: NORC at the University of Chicago [producer and distributor]. Column variable: GSS year for this respondent (1973-2014). [Row variable: R favor close relative marrying a white person. Column variable: Gss year for this respondent. Case Selections: (1) respondent identified as both Jewish and white, (2) all respondents who identify as white]

15 Some may wonder whether Jews consider other Jews in this GSS sample to be white. While I have been unable to find surveys that deal directly with this question, there is reason to think that Jews generally consider each other white. This is because 95 percent of American Jews identify as Non-Hispanic whites even when presented with a wide array of racial categories. Given that all the Jews in this GSS sample self-identified as white, it seems highly probable that most Jews in the sample considered other Jews to be white as well.

16 *America's Changing Religious Landscape ~ Christians Decline Sharply as Share of Population; Unaffiliated and Other Faiths Continue to Grow* (Rep.). (2015, May 12). Retrieved December 3, 2015, from Pew Research Center website. The degree of “same-religion” marital overrepresentation was calculated by comparing what one would expect if spouses were chosen at random, to the actual proportion of same-religion marriages found within Pew’s sample data (actual/expected). On the assumption that spouses are chosen at random, the likelihood that any married member of a religious group has a spouse with the same background should be that religion’s share of the population. Since Jews are 2 percent of the population, we would expect 2 percent of married Jews to have Jewish spouses. According to Pew, 56 percent of married Jews have Jewish spouses. This means that Jews are roughly 28 times more likely to marry within their religion that would be expected by chance (0.56/0.02) ≈ 28.

- While this is a valid method for measuring degrees of marital overrepresentation within small religions, it may not be when used to compare marital homophily between groups with radically different population sizes. This is because large religious groups tend to be more geographically dispersed, whereas smaller groups tend to live in areas with relatively higher concentrations of their co-religionists. Members of large religious groups cannot always indulge their preference for religious similarity because they may be unable to find a nearby partner with the desired criteria. Small religious groups can afford to be more selective because, relatively speaking, they live closer to a greater number of their co-religionists, and thus can afford to be more selective.
The Pew Religious Landscape Study (2014) reports different values for childhood religion retention rates by religion. This discrepancy exists entirely because of the corrections I’ve made to Pew’s survey data. For some reason, Pew uses fine-grained distinctions when measuring retention rates of Christian groups, yet broad distinctions when comparing non-Christian groups within the same tradition.

For example, Pew would classify people raised as an Orthodox Jews who later “converted” to Reform Judaism, as “still identifying with their childhood religion.” On the other hand, if people who were raised as Evangelical Protestants later “converted” to mainline Protestantism, Pew says they “no longer identify with their childhood religion.” Pew also fails to apply fine-grained distinctions when Muslims switch their preferred Islamic denomination.

This seems wrong. People who change sects or traditions within Christianity, Judaism, or Islam should be classified as “still identifying with a variant of one’s childhood religion.” This is why I re-organized Pew’s religious retention data in the following graph using an “apples to apples” comparison.

[Note: Christian groups are: Adventists, Anabaptists, Baptists, Congregationalists, Anglicans, Holiness, Lutherans, Methodists, Nondenominational Protestants, Pentecostalists, Presbyterians, Reformed, Restorationists, Catholics, Mormons, Orthodox Christians, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, etc.]


Smith, Tom W, Peter Marsden, Michael Hout, and Jibum Kim. General Social Surveys, 1972-2014 [machine-readable data file] Principal Investigator, Tom W. Smith; Co-Principal Investigator, Peter V. Marsden; Co-Principal Investigator, Michael Hout TOO MANY AUTHORS. JUST SAY Tom W. Smith et. al.; Sponsored by National Science Foundation. - NORC ed. - Chicago: NORC at the University of Chicago [producer and distributor]. Column variable: GSS year for this respondent (1973-2014). [Row variable: How close feel to blacks. Column variable: Gss year for this respondent. Case Selections: (1) all respondents who identify as white, (2) all respondents who identify as both white and Jewish (groups 1 and 2 analyzed separately) [While you may think this citation format is excessively long, this citation style follows the format the people who run the GSS want researchers to use. That said, if you don’t like it, I’d be happy to change the format.]

The term “gentile” is synonymous here with “all self-identified whites.” It is also used as a proxy for white gentiles (with European Jews being 2 percent of this particular proxy population).

Admittedly, the possibility that a question that asks Jews about their emotional closeness to whites is somewhat confounded by the fact that many Jews view both European Jews and European gentiles as white. While one may have
preferred the GSS to ask Jews about their feelings toward European gentiles, this finding still provides some empirical support for the idea that Jews generally feel the same level of closeness towards gentile whites as ordinary white gentiles do. I DON'T UNDERSTAND THE POINT YOU ARE MAKING HERE. PROBABLY BEST TO DELETE THIS NOTE. [Since Jews overwhelming identify as white, and since they do have a mild tendency towards ethnocentrism… they may have other Jews in mind when they consider their emotional closeness towards “white people.” Skeptics could argue that the data is little more than a proxy for how close Jews feel toward other Jews. They might also retort that if Jews were asked specific questions about how close they felt towards white gentiles, that the results would be far more dismal and “out of step.” I added this endnote in order to pre-emptively acknowledge this limitation … for purposes of honesty and rhetorical effectiveness. However, if the minor point is needlessly lengthy I’m not opposed to deleting it]


32 Ibid.


34 A common retort to the idea that the Jews of Europe, Canada, and Australia appear to be more right-wing than American Jews and their gentile countrymen is to point out that these right-wing parties have supported Israel, open borders, and other leftist causes. Jewish support for marginally pro-white parties may be a kind of devil’s bargain meant to support Israel and advance the ethnic interests of Jews.

No matter how neutered right-wing political parties may be, leftist parties are far more anti-white. If they wanted to, Jews in Canada, Australia, Britain, and France could support electable leftist parties. Yet Jewish majorities in these countries consistently supported the right. This support has not only endured, but has actually grown over the past few decades.

The profoundly anti-white policies of the leftist parties of Europe, Canada, and Australia, did not prevent an even larger share of gentiles from supporting them. While voting for the right may be a lackluster sign of pro-white sentiment, surely the decision to withhold support from the left is an indicator of relative support for whites.

Finally, as discussed in Section III, the immigration and foreign policy attitudes of Jewish Republicans are completely in line with those of white gentiles in the Republican party. Unfortunately, we lack sufficient data to compare the attitudes of Jews and gentiles with the same party affiliation in countries other than the United States. However, the convergence of attitudes of Jews and gentiles in the same party within the US does suggest that, on average, Jews who support the right elsewhere are about as sincere as their gentile countrymen.


38 Since Canadian pollsters avoid using traditional racial categories, in my analysis of Canadian poll data I defined “gentile” as “any person who was neither an aboriginal nor a visible minority.”


Since Jews are such a small percentage of the British population, estimates of recent Jewish voting patterns vary, as do estimates of Jewish support for UKIP. For example, according to the British Election Study (Wave 6 ~ Post-Election-Wave; May 2015), approximately 52 percent of Jews voted for the Conservatives, 29 percent voted for Labour, 8 percent voted for the Liberal Democrats, 5 percent voted for UKIP, and 5 percent voted for the Greens (n = 207; max margin of error: ±6.8 percent). However, if we aggregate data on voter intentions before and after the 2015 general election (i.e. Waves 1-6; Feb 2014 – May 2015), using likely Jewish voters with clear intentions as a base, Jewish voting patterns yield the following estimate: Conservatives 49 percent, Labour 30 percent, UKIP, 9 percent, and Greens 5 percent (n = 1,152; maximum margin of error at 95 percent confidence: ±2.9 percent). Data were from the British Election Study.

I estimated that 59 percent of French Jews voted for a right-wing party by adding the 45 percent of the Jewish vote that went to the UMP to the 13.5 percent that went to the National Front (rounding to the nearest tenth). These percentages are from the source previously cited.


Gentile and Jewish American voter tables from 1916-2012: http://tinyurl.com/hkxjsbc. Operational definitions for “leftist presidential candidates” for each year are also provided.

Note: Although the line graph with square markers purports to depict the voting pattern of the general white population, it should be noted that each of the displayed data points contains small Jewish subsamples. However, Jews comprised only 2-3 percent of this group over the past hundred years or so. As such, the line with square markers should be taken to represent the general voting behavior of white gentiles in the United States, for all practical purposes.


6 percent didn't know or refused to answer the question. Jews are more likely to say they “don’t know” what their political orientation is, and they’re more likely to refuse to answer the question. To correct for this, I normalized both samples to exclude all respondents who said "Don't Know" or "Refused." The revised results showed that Jews (n = 8,275) were 61 percent liberal and 39 percent conservative, whereas whites (AGAIN) (n = 244,795) were about 60 percent conservative and 40 percent Liberal.


67 Smith, T. W. (2005). Jewish distinctiveness in America: A statistical portrait. American Jewish Committee. (1) By “equally likely” I mean that the 95 percent confidence intervals of Jews and group Y overlapped. (2) By “more likely” I mean a greater percentage of Jews answered X, and the 95 percent confidence intervals of Jews and population Y did not overlap. (3) By “less likely” I mean that a smaller percentage of Jews answered X, and the 95 percent confidence intervals of Jews and group Y did not overlap. (4) By “more similar” I mean the percentage of Jews who answered each of these 29 questions was more strongly correlated with the corresponding percentage of other groups P, Q, R, etc., who answered the same questions.

68 Smith, Tom W, Peter Marsden, Michael Hout, and Jibum Kim. General Social Surveys, 1972-2014 [machine-readable data file] /Principal Investigator, Tom W. Smith; Co-Principal Investigator, Peter V. Marsden; Co-Principal Investigator, Michael Hout; Sponsoring National Science Foundation. -NORC ed. - Chicago: NORC at the University of Chicago [producer and distributor]. Column variable: GSS year for this respondent (1973-2014). [Row variable: Confidence in the press. Column variable: GSS year for this respondent. Case Selections: (1) respondent identified as both Jewish and white, and (2) all respondents who identify as white.]

69 Ibid. [Row variable: Confidence in education. Column variable: GSS year for this respondent. Case Selections: (1) respondent identified as both Jewish and white, and (2) all respondents who identify as white.]

70 Ibid, 66.

71 I do not mean to suggest that the Jewish public necessarily opposes the activities of Jewish elites. I’m suggesting only that the available evidence supports the view that the Jewish public does not jump on the anti-white bandwagon driven by their elites. The reasons for this are a separate issue, and beyond the scope of this essay.


73 A comprehensive table of Jew-gentile immigration attitude comparisons can be found here: [http://tinyurl.com/jyozlf9](http://tinyurl.com/jyozlf9). Note the reported “margin of error” actually reflects a 95% Bayesian credibility interval for a given sample. There are many ways to calculate credibility intervals for the sake of estimating some population parameter. Just like pollsters who use frequentist statistics, Reuters/Ipsos use a single measure of precision for the sake of characterizing all responses from members of a given population. For the sake of simplicity (while also reducing the likelihood of
a type-1 error), Reuters/Ipsos have opted to calculate the largest possible credibility interval for all observed responses from a sample (i.e. for a 50%-point estimate).

74 Actual percentage point differences between Jews and gentiles on each survey proportion (White percentage - Jewish percentage) could be positive or negative. This is because I took the actual percentage point difference instead of the absolute value of the difference. In addition, all percentage-point differences obtained from Reuters/Ipsos surveys were given equal weight when average differences were calculated.

75 Reuters/Ipsos. (2015, July 31). *Polling Explorer: Trump vs. Clinton*. Retrieved July 5, 2016. Jewish and white gentile Republicans are still equally likely to support Trump in the 2016 General Election, even if the base is changed from “adults” to “registered voters” or to “likely general election voters.”

76 Ibid.

77 Jew-Gentile Foreign Policy Attitude Comparisons (Ipsos/Reuters Excel File): [http://tinyurl.com/z858uas](http://tinyurl.com/z858uas)


80 Assuming the data are normally distributed, the odds of obtaining a value over 3.9 SD from the regression line are over 1 in 10,000.


82 An excel file containing the relevant raw-data international-level data (and relevant citations) can be accessed here: [http://tinyurl.com/jml9tsb](http://tinyurl.com/jml9tsb).

83 Ibid.

84 *World Publics Welcome Global Trade — But Not Immigration* (Rep.). (March 31, 2010). Retrieved February 29, 2016, from Pew Research Center ~ Global Attitudes and Trends. [Correlation obtained from endnote 1A and from this citation]

85 List of countries used: United States, Canada, France, UK, Sweden, Ukraine, Germany, Russia, Italy, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Spain, and Poland. [The relevant data are linked to or mentioned in the reference previously cited.]

86 Link to an excel file containing the relevant data by state and year can be found here: [http://tinyurl.com/gskcx6p](http://tinyurl.com/gskcx6p). Note, changes in the foreign born and Jewish population are calculated as 10-year percentage point changes in the number of Jews and/or foreign born persons per 100,000 by state.

87 Link to an excel file containing the relevant state-level data can be found here: [http://tinyurl.com/j3qnley](http://tinyurl.com/j3qnley).

88 Controlling for all 32 variables simultaneously in multiple regression introduced rampant multicollinearity into the model. In spite of this, pro-alien policy scores were not only significant, but were also best predictor of the relative size of a state’s foreign-born population ($β = 0.45, p < 0.01$). Transforming the data via box-cox transformations (after adding a constant to all the variables), reduced (but did not eliminate) rampant multicollinearity, despite increasing the normality of the data. To reduce multicollinearity while also controlling these transformed variables, I performed principle component analysis (PCA) on 27 of the variables (excluding PAP scores and the Jewish share of the population). I also excluded Asians as a percentage of the population, average age, and subjective well-being. The latter three variables were excluded on the grounds that they (a) did not meet inclusion criteria for PCA, and (b) did not independently explain any of the variation in the foreign born population of states when other factors were held constant.

Six latent factors emerged from the analysis with Eigenvalues > 1. Cumulatively they accounted for 82% of the variation in the observed variables they were derived from. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin’s measure of sampling adequacy totaled 0.77. The KMO
appropriateness cutoff for performing factor analysis (or PCA) is generally considered to be 0.5. As such, these result support the decision to control for this wide array of variables by reducing them to scores from a smaller number of underlying factors.

When the foreign born percentage of a state’s population was regressed onto the factor scores from these six factors along with PAP scores and the Jewish share of the population, the resulting Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) value for each of the variables ranged between 1.1 and 4.1. Since VIF scores >5 are generally taken to indicate problematic levels of multicollinearity, and since VIF score from the previous model ranged between 4.9 and 240, this move eliminated the problem of multicollinearity from the model with a minimal loss of information (adjusted R² fell from 0.95 to 0.89). The model also passed the assumption checks for linearity, normality, and independence.

Despite these controls, the degree to which a state had pro-alien policies was found to be the biggest predictor of its foreign-born population (β = 0.41, p < 0.0001).

Controlling for the aforementioned factors eliminated the correlation between the Jewish and foreign-born population (β = 0.12, p > 0.19). This was true whether or not pro-alien policy scores were included in the model.

Smith, Tom W, Peter Marsden, Michael Hout, and Jibum Kim. General Social Surveys, 1972-2014 [machine-readable data file] /Principal Investigator, Tom W. Smith; Co-Principal Investigator, Peter V. Marsden; Co-Principal Investigator, Michael Hout; Sponsored by National Science Foundation. -NORC ed. - Chicago: NORC at the University of Chicago [producer and distributor]. Column variable: GSS year for this respondent (1973-2014). [Row variable: Differences due to inborn disability. Column variable: Gss year for this respondent. Case Selections: (1) all respondents who identify as white, (2) all respondents who identify as both white and Jewish (analyzed separately).]


List of 75 Prominent Race Realists with Jewish backgrounds: http://tinyurl.com/gv9tp5o. If my colleagues and I discovered no evidence that a prominent race realist had Jewish ancestry or a Jewish surname, then we assumed that he or she was not Jewish. Given this approach, it is entirely possible that some race realists who were categorized as gentiles might actually be Jewish in spite of the lack of evidence. As such, it is not improbable that this analysis underestimates the true proportion of prominent race realists who possess Jewish backgrounds.


The probability that an immigrant to the US was deported can be found by (a) adding the total number of deportations between 1908 and 1939, (b) adding the total number of net arrivals during the same period, and (c) dividing the former by the latter for both Jewish immigrants and the general immigrant population (analyzed separately). In other words: P(Immigrant-Deported) = [(239,527/8,483,558) ≈ 0.0282]; P(Jew-Deported) = [(5,315/1,156,981) ≈ 0.0045].

- **Note 1:** For all intents and purposes, the only immigrants who could be deported from the US between 1908 and 1939 were those who had first obtained lawful residency status, and who had not voluntarily left the country. This is because (a) illegal immigration to the US was rare, (b) native-born US citizens could not be deported, (c) people who have already left the country cannot be deported, and (d) people who attempted to immigrate to the US, but who were refused entry were characterized as “debarred” not “deported,” and should be excluded from the sample.

- **Note 2:** We do not know how many immigrants who arrived in a given year were deported that same year. This is because deportations of new residents and longtime residents have been lumped together into a single statistic.
Thus it is only possible to estimate only the proportion of immigrants who were deported “in the long run.” Accordingly, the data covers a 31-year period starting with the first year official immigration statistics were kept.

- Note 3: Technically, Jews were about 16% as likely to be deported than the general immigrant population between 1908 and 1939 (0.0045/0.0282)*100 ≈ 16%.

The number of people attempting to immigrate to the US is calculated as the total number of arrivals plus the total number of debarred immigrants. This is because every debarred person was also would-be immigrant.

This odds ratio represents data weighted to account for population size. If the 1899-1939 data are not weighted for population size, and are instead depicted as a yearly average, then Jews were only 56% as likely to be debarred from a US port as the general immigrant population.

Source can be found in the next citation. Links to an excel file containing this and other Jewish immigration data to the United States can be found at endnotes 1D and 1E.


I do not mean to suggest that every Jew who left Russia was fleeing antisemitism. Undoubtedly, many Russian Jews were economic migrants. The desire to join family members also played a significant role in the decision of many Jews to leave Russia. Nevertheless, it is still true that Jewish perceptions of anti-Semitism appear to be an important reason why Russian Jews established roots in the New World.


From the 1790s until the 1820s, American Jews appear to have favored Jeffersonian Democrats. After the mass immigration of German Jews to the US (1830-1860), Jews tended to support Jacksonian Democrats, yet from end of the Civil War until the early 20th century, they tended to support the Republican Party.
Because Evangelicals are the most zealous and obtrusive of all Christians, and given the interested nature of Evangelical support for Jews and Israel, Jewish hostility toward them supports the view that Jews are reacting negatively to Christianity per se. Jews have the lowest opinion of the most religious Christians, even if those Christians are, objectively, one of the most pro-Jewish and pro-Zionist groups.

On the other hand, many gentiles think of Evangelicals as uncultured and faintly ridiculous. To the extent that Jews share this view, their low opinion of Evangelicals may reflect opposition to Christianity.


140 Graph Combines all the AJC Survey of Jewish Opinion 2004-2007 responses to the question “In your opinion, what proportion of each of the following groups in the United States is anti-Semitic—most, many, some, very few, or none?” for Asians, Hispanics, Blacks, Evangelical Protestants, and Catholics, into a single sample.


143 Christians as a percentage of the population was calculated by adding up the percentage of the population who was “Protestant, Christians (nonspecific), Catholic, and Mormon” from Gallup polls for the years 1997 to 2015. [See previous citation]


147 Ibid, 137.


149 Ibid, 137.


151 “Total anti-Semitism” is the percentage of American Jews who say that anti-Semitism is a “serious problem” in the US, plus those who say it is “somewhat of a problem.”

152 Compared to other recent polls, 72 percent Gallup figure appears to be a low estimate for Christians in the United States. However, this result was used in order to make the international correlation more conservative.

• Data are from endnote #145 (Year = 2015).
• Using a higher estimate for Christians as a percentage of the US population increases the international negative correlation between the share of Christians within a nation and how often Jews in that nation tends to vote for right-wing parties.


154 Australia, Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2008, February 7). 1301.0 - Year Book Australia, 2008. Retrieved December 10, 2015. The percentage of the Australian population that was Christian was calculated by adding up the percentages of all the subgroups under the “Christian” category for a grand total of 63.8 percent.

The CIA says France is between 63-66 percent Christian. \((63 + 66)/2 = 64.5\) percent.

The percentage of Jews in each country who voted for the right was calculated as follows. France Jewish Vote percentage = UMP + National Front. US Jewish Vote percentage = Republican Party. Canadian Jewish Vote percentage = Canadian Conservative Party. United Kingdom Jewish Vote percentage = British Conservative Party + United Kingdom Independence Party + British National Party. Australian Jewish Vote percentage = Liberal Party of Australia.


The political affiliation categories Pew used for their American sample were “Liberal, Moderate, Conservative,” whereas Pew gave Israeli Jews the options “Left, Center, Right.” Admittedly these are not quite the same, and there are probably cultural differences in the meanings of these categories. Nevertheless, Israeli Jews appear to be far less liberal than their American counterparts.


Graham, D., Staetsky, L., & Boyd, J. (2014, January). Jews in the United Kingdom in 2013: Preliminary findings from the National Jewish Community Survey (Rep.). Retrieved April 25, 2016, from Institute for Jewish Policy Research. Note: being “very important” to a sense of “Jewish identity” was interpreted as being synonymous with the “essential to being Jewish” Pew survey question, which is linked to in the previous citation.


I aggregated all of Reuters's political inclination data for all whites (n = 307,351) and Jews (n = 9,154) between October 1, 2012 and September 29, 2015. The data were then normalized to exclude “Don’t Know” responses.

The data were then normalized to exclude “Don’t Know” responses.

Religiosity is controlled for by subgroup analysis (i.e. by selecting respondents who said they never attended religious services). Education was controlled for concurrently, and was controlled by further restricting the sample to whites and European Jews with a bachelor’s degree or higher.

The data are behind an access wall. They can be obtained only by requesting login credentials from the institute.

European Jews and irreligious whites agreed on 96 out of 110 Reuters immigration items (i.e. there were no statistically significant differences between the groups 87 percent of the time). Jewish Democrats and irreligious white Democrats agreed 98 percent of the time. Jewish Republicans and irreligious white Republicans agreed 95 percent of the time.

This implicitly assumes that the subgroup analysis performed does not reduce the size of the age brackets of the groups being compared. A subgroup analysis that inadvertently reduced the group sample sizes too much might fail to find a positive association between age and conservatism simply because small sample have a tendency to produce less consistent and more extreme values.

Strictly speaking, atheists are an exception. However, since atheists suffer some of the strongest outgroup hostility in the United States today, the fact that they become more liberal as they age is consistent with a reactionary theory of leftist attitudes in minority groups.


Personal communication from Prof. MacDonald, cited with permission.


